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Wednesday, August 29, 2012

rash and negligent driving of the driver.“Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice of “order” should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his “Law in Changing Society” stated that, “State of criminal law continues to be – as it should be – a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society”. Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be.”In view of the aforesaid, we have to weigh whether the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as regards the mitigating factors deserves acceptance. Compassion is being sought on the ground of young age and mercy is being invoked on the foundation of solemnization of marriage. The date of occurrence is in the month of March, 2006. The scars on the collective cannot be said to have been forgotten. Weighing the individual difficulty as against the social order, collective conscience and the duty of the Court, we are disposed to think that the substantive sentence affirmed by the High Court does not warrant any interference and, accordingly, we concur with the same. 31. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of any substance, stands dismissed.


                             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1325            OF 2012
             (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 9132 of 2011


Guru Basavaraj @ Benne Settappa                      ... Appellant
                                   Versus
State of Karnataka                                     ... Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


Dipak Misra, J.


      Leave granted.

2.    In this appeal preferred by special leave under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution of India, the  assail  is  to  the  judgment  and  order  dated
21.06.2011 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 2284  of  2009  passed  by  the
High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad whereby the High court  has
concurred with the judgment of conviction and order of  sentence  passed  by
the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Hospet in Criminal Appeal No. 58  of  2008
wherein the appellate court had set aside the sentence under Section 279  of
the Indian Penal  Code,  1860  (for  short  “the  IPC”)   and  affirmed  the
conviction and sentence for offences punishable under Sections 337, 338  and
304 A of the IPC as passed by the Judicial Magistrate First  Class,  Hospet.


3.    The broad essential  facts  leading  to  the  trial  of  the  accused-
appellant (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  accused’)      are  that  on
25.03.2006,  about  10.15  a.m.,   the   accused-driver   was   driving   an
unregistered new tractor on National Highway No. 13 at bypass road near  the
open well of one Golya Naik.   The tractor turned turtle  towards  the  left
side and caused simple injuries to many people who were sitting  inside  the
trailer of the tractor and grievous injuries  to  three  persons.    Injured
Kotraiah succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident.  Be it  noted,
all the injured persons were  travelling  along  with  their  goods  in  the
trailer of the said tractor.

4.    After the accident took  place,  the  concerned  police  sub-inspector
(PSI) reached the spot, recorded the statement of the  injured  persons  and
after returning to the police  station  registered  an  FIR  and  thereafter
proceeded to the spot,  prepared the  sketch  map,  seized  the  vehicle  in
question and sent the dead  body  for  post-mortem.   After  completing  the
investigation, he placed the charge-sheet before  the  Competent  Court  for
the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A  of  the  IPC
read with Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

5.    The prosecution, in order to substantiate  the  allegations,  examined
10 witnesses and got a number of documents marked as exhibits P-1 to P-24.

6.    The accused, in his statement under Section 313  Cr.P.C.,  denied  the
incriminating material brought against him  and  took  the  stand  that  the
accident occurred due to mechanical failure and  not  because  of  rash  and
negligent driving.  However, he chose not to adduce any evidence.

7.    The learned Magistrate acquitted the  accused  of  the  offence  under
Section 187 of the 1988 Act and convicted him for  the  offences  punishable
under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC and sentenced him  to  pay
a certain sum as fine and, in default of payment of  the  same,  to  undergo
simple imprisonment for a specific period in respect of the  offences  under
Sections 279 and 337 and Section 338 of the IPC As far as the offence  under
Section 304-A of the IPC is concerned, the learned  Magistrate  imposed  the
sentence of simple imprisonment of six months and  to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.
2000/- and, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment of 45 days.

8.    On an appeal being preferred assailing the  conviction  and  sentence,
the learned appellate Judge basically posed two questions,  namely,  whether
the findings recorded by the trial  court  are  erroneous  and  whether  the
sentence passed by the  trial  court  required  to  be  interfered  with  in
appeal.   After analysing the evidence, the appellate  court  came  to  hold
that it had been proven beyond doubt that the accused being the driver of  a
newly purchased unregistered tractor not only overloaded  tamarind  bags  on
the old trailer but also allowed 22  passengers  to  travel  on  the  loaded
trailer and due to  his  negligence,  the  trailer  got  detached  from  the
tractor as a consequence of which it turned turtle by the side of the  road.
  That apart, after detachment of the trailer, the tractor moved  up  to  30
feet which clearly reflected that the tractor was in high speed.

9.    The learned appellate Judge concurred with the  view  of  the  learned
Magistrate that the accident had not occurred due to mechanical  defect  but
there was rash and negligence on the part of the accused and  the  same  had
been established by the unimpeachable  evidence  of  independent  witnesses.
Because of the aforesaid  view,  he  answered  the  first  question  in  the
negative.  As far as the second question  is  concerned,  he  sustained  the
conviction in respect of  all  the  offences  but  set  aside  the  sentence
imposed for the offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC.

10.    Questioning  the  legal  sustainability  of  the  conviction,  it  is
submitted by Mr. S. N. Bhat, learned counsel for  the  appellant,  that  all
the courts have fallen into grave error by expressing the opinion  that  the
accident had not occurred due to mechanical failure,  namely,  due  to  non-
functioning of the  hydraulic  system  in  a  proper  manner,  and  such  an
expression of opinion  vividly  exposits  perversity  of  approach.   It  is
further urged by him that when the  appellant  has  been  acquitted  of  the
offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC,  he  could  not  have  been
punished in respect  of  the  rest  of  the  offences.   The  last  limb  of
submission of Mr. Bhatt is that at the time of the accident,  the  appellant
was 22 years of age and, in the meantime, his marriage has taken place  and,
therefore, the same should be regarded as acceptable mitigating factors  and
the  substantive  sentence  should  be  restricted  to  the  period  already
undergone in custody and the quantum of fine be enhanced.

11.   Ms. Vishruti  Vijay,  learned  counsel  for  the  State,  per  contra,
contended that the analysis of the evidence made by the  learned  Magistrate
as  well  as  by  the  appellate  court  are  absolutely  flawless  and  the
concurrence thereof by the High Court, in no manner, can  be  stated  to  be
perverse. It is put forth by him that there  is  ample  evidence  on  record
that the incident took place due to rash and negligent act on  the  part  of
the appellant  and  the  said  finding,  being  appositely  founded  on  the
material on record,  does  not  warrant  any  interference  by  this  Court.
Commenting on the submission that the appellant  has  been  acquitted  under
Section 279 of the IPC and hence, he deserves to be acquitted in respect  of
the other offences, it is  propounded  by  Ms.  Vishruti  Vijay  that  on  a
studied perusal of the judgment of the learned appellate Judge, it is  quite
clear that he has maintained the  conviction  and  not  imposed  a  separate
sentence under Section 279 of the IPC and,  for  that  reason,  he  has  set
aside the sentence but not the  conviction.   The  learned  counsel  further
submitted that regard being had  to  the  careless,  negligent  and  callous
attitude that has been exhibited by the  drivers  who  are  expected  to  be
professionals, the rate of road accidents that has extremely gone  high  and
further, in the case at hand, when so many people have  been  injured,  some
have  sustained  grievous  injuries  and  a  life  has  been  lost,  lenient
delineation would be an anathema to the concept of adequate punishment.

12.   First, we shall deal with the facet of rash and negligent  driving  of
the driver.  The learned counsel for the appellant has  submitted  that  the
vehicle turned turtle due to mechanical failure i.e. non-functioning of  the
hydraulic system in a proper manner.  To appreciate the said submission,  we
have carefully perused the material brought on record and the analysis  made
by the courts below.  On a careful scrutiny of the same, we  find  that  all
the courts have placed reliance on independent  witnesses  as  well  as  the
testimony of PW-10, the Motor Vehicle Inspector.  The manner  in  which  the
accident occurred due to detachment of the trailer from the tractor and  the
distance to which the tractor moved vividly  reveals  that  the  vehicle  in
question was driven recklessly at a high  speed.   The  plea  of  mechanical
failure as  put  forth  by  the  accused  was  not  even  suggested  to  the
Inspector. What is sought to be emphasised before this Court  is  that  PW-3
has deposed that the accident  occurred  due  to  mechanical  failure.   The
trial court as well as the High Court has not accepted the testimony of  PW-
3 as  he  is  only  an  agriculturist  while  the  other  technical  experts
including the Motor Vehicle  Inspector  have  deposed  about  the  rash  and
negligent driving.  Analysing the evidence in entirety,  the  learned  trial
judge as well as the appellate judge has returned  the  finding  as  regards
the rash and negligent driving.  The appellate court, on  further  scrutiny,
has found that the evidence on record clearly  shows  that  the  driver  has
taken the vehicle to the left side of the  road  and,  in  the  process,  he
moved away from the main road to the ‘kachcha’ road  and  thereby  the  link
between the tractor and the  trailer  got  detached.   The  High  Court  has
opined that the accused has not taken care to see  that  the  speed  of  the
tractor was within limit so that the trailer could not be detached.  In  our
considered view, the analysis of the factual score in this regard cannot  be
regarded to be perverse and, therefore, not liable to be unsettled  by  this
Court.

13.   The next limb of submission of the learned counsel for  the  appellant
is that when he has been acquitted under Section 279 of the IPC,  he  cannot
be punished in respect of the other offences as the allegation of  rash  and
negligent act  cannot  be  treated  to  have  been  proven.   The  aforesaid
submission, on a first blush, may look quite attractive,  but  on  a  deeper
scrutiny of the judgment passed by the appellate court, it melts into  total
insignificance.  The learned appellate judge, after due appreciation of  the
evidence on record as expected of  an  appellate  court,  has  come  to  the
conclusion that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and  negligent
manner.  After ascribing some reason, he has  thought  it  apposite  that  a
separate sentence should not be imposed under Section 279 of the  IPC,  and,
accordingly, he has set aside the sentence awarded by the trial  court.   It
is apposite to state here that there is  a  distinction  between  conviction
and sentence.  A conviction is the proof of  the  offence  committed  by  an
accused.  It  is  the  proof  of  guilt  of  the  offence.   The  punishment
component is the sentence.  In Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang  and  others[1],
a three-Judge Bench of this Court, after referring to  Section  354  of  the
Code of Criminal Procedure, has stated that every judgment  referred  to  in
Section 353 of the Code, shall, inter alia, specify  the  offence  of  which
the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced.   This
Court, while dealing with the power of the High Court under  Section  389(1)
of the Code, has observed that ordinarily an order of conviction  by  itself
is not capable of execution under the Code, but it is the order of  sentence
or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release  on  probation
which are capable of  execution  and  which,  if  not  suspended,  would  be
required to be executed by the authorities.   It  has  been  further  stated
that in certain situations, the order of conviction  can  be  executable  in
the sense that it may incur a disqualification.  We  have  referred  to  the
aforesaid authority only to highlight that there is a distinction between  a
conviction and a sentence.  In the instant case,  as  the  judgment  of  the
appellate court would show, the view has  been  expressed  that  a  separate
sentence under Section 279 of the IPC is  not  necessary  and,  accordingly,
the said sentence has been set aside.  The reading of  the  entire  judgment
makes it graphically clear that the conviction under Section 279 of the  IPC
has not been annulled.   It  is  noticeable  that  the  rash  and  negligent
driving by the accused that resulted in the causation  of  injuries  to  the
persons travelling in the trailer has been proved.  There is no  cavil  that
some have been seriously injured and one person who was  grievously  injured
breathed his last.  Thus, the submission of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant that he has been acquitted of the offence  under  Section  279  of
the IPC does not deserve acceptance, and, accordingly,  we,  unhesitatingly,
repel the same.

14.   The last plank  of  submission  of  Mr.  Bhat  is  that  the  accused-
appellant was a young man of 22 years at the time of the occurrence  and  in
the meantime, he has entered into wedlock  and,  therefore,  maintaining  of
substantive sentence would be inapposite,  and  in  fitness  of  things,  it
should be restricted to the period already undergone and the amount of  fine
may be enhanced with the stipulation that it shall be paid  as  compensation
to the victims of the accident.

15.   The aforesaid  submission,  in  our  considered  opinion,  requires  a
careful and cautious examination.  What is basically sought to be argued  on
behalf  of  the  appellant  is  that  there  are  mitigating   circumstances
warranting lenient treatment.  As we perceive, two aspects, namely, (i)  the
age of the accused at the  time  of  the  accident;  and  (ii)  his  present
marital status, have been highlighted  as  mitigating  factors.   Before  we
dwell upon whether these two  aspects  should  be  regarded  as  extenuating
factors to reduce the sentence in a crime of  this  nature  in  the  present
social context, we think it apt to  refer  to  certain  authorities  in  the
field.


16.   In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias  Raju[2],  while  dealing  with
the concept of adequate punishment in relation to an offence  under  Section
304-A of the IPC, the Court stated that considerations of undue sympathy  in
such cases will not only lead  to  miscarriage  of  justice  but  will  also
undermine the confidence of the public  in  the  efficacy  of  the  criminal
justice dispensation  system.  It  need  be  hardly  pointed  out  that  the
imposition of a sentence of fine of  Rs.  250  on  the  driver  of  a  Motor
Vehicle for an offence under Section 304-A of the IPC and that  too  without
any extenuating or mitigating circumstance is bound to shock the  conscience
of any one and will unmistakably leave the impression that the trial  was  a
mockery of justice.  Thereafter, this Court enhanced  the  sentence  to  six
months rigorous imprisonment with fine of  Rs.  1000  and,  in  default,  to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months.


17.   In Sevaka Perumal and another v. State of Tamil Nadu[3], it  has  been
emphasized  that  undue  sympathy  resulting  in  imposition  of  inadequate
sentence would do more harm to the justice system and undermine  the  public
confidence in the efficacy of law.


18.   In Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil and Ors.  v.  State  of  Gujarat[4],  the
Court, adverting to the  new  challenges  of  sentencing,  opined  that  the
courts are constantly faced with the situation where they  are  required  to
answer to new challenges and mould  the  sentencing  system  to  meet  those
challenges. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is  the  avowed
object of law and that is required to be achieved  by  imposing  appropriate
sentence.

19.   In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana[5], this Court expressed thus:

      “Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents  in  India  and
      the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their  families,
      criminal  courts  cannot  treat  the  nature  of  the  offence   under
      Section 304A IPC  as   attracting   the   benevolent   provisions   of
      Section 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to
      be imposed for the offence of  causing  death  by  rash  or  negligent
      driving of automobiles, one of  the  prime  considerations  should  be
      deterrence.”

Thereafter,  the  Court  proceeded  to  highlight  what  is  expected  of  a
professional driver:

      “A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost
      throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform  himself  that
      he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or  inattentiveness
      when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and
      should not take a  chance  thinking  that  a  rash  driving  need  not
      necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need
      not necessarily result in the death of any human  being;  or  even  if
      such death ensues he might  not  be  convicted  of  the  offence;  and
      lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with  leniently
      by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that  if
      he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being  due
      to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence.
      This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the  level
      of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to
      callous driving of automobiles.”



20.   In State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basanagouda Aregoudar[6],  it  has
been ruled that if the accused  are  found  guilty  of  rash  and  negligent
driving, courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do  not  escape  the
clutches of law very lightly. The sentence  imposed  by  the  courts  should
have deterrent effect on potential wrong-doers and  it  should  commensurate
with the seriousness of  the  offence.  Of  course,  the  courts  are  given
discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide  and  varying
range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the  quantum  of  sentence,
but the discretion  shall  be  exercised  with  due  regard  to  the  larger
interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing  of  sentence
on the offender is probably the most public face  of  the  criminal  justice
system.

21.   In State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru  and  Anr.[7],  it  has  been
ruled that the object should be to protect society and the avowed object  of
law is achieved by imposing appropriate sentence to deter the  criminal.  It
is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing  system  so  as  to
impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the  society  and  the
sentencing process has to be stern where it should be.


22.   Yet again in B. Nagabhushanam V.  State of  Karnataka[8],  the  Court,
taking note of the fact  that  the  vehicle  was  being  driven  rashly  and
negligently, opined that six months' simple imprisonment and a direction  to
the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for  commission  of  the  offence
punishable under Section 304-A and simple imprisonment for one month and  to
pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence punishable under Section 279 of  the
Indian Penal Code cannot be said to be shocking.


23.   Recently, in State of Punjab v.  Balwinder  Singh  and  Ors.[9],  this
Court while dealing with the concept of sentencing, has stated thus:


      “While considering the quantum of  sentence  to  be  imposed  for  the
      offence of causing death or injury by rash and  negligent  driving  of
      automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. The
      persons driving motor vehicles cannot and should  not  take  a  chance
      thinking that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently
      by the Court”.

24.   In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra[10],  it  has  been
laid down that sentencing is an  important  task  in  relation  to  criminal
justice dispensation system. One of the prime  objectives  of  the  criminal
law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate  sentence
commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the  manner  in  which
the crime is done. There  is  no  straitjacket  formula  for  sentencing  an
accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles:  twin
objective of the  sentencing  policy  is  deterrence  and  correction.  What
sentence  would  meet  the  ends  of  justice  depends  on  the  facts   and
circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind  the  gravity  of
the crime, motive for the  crime,  nature  of  the  offence  and  all  other
attendant circumstances.  It has been further opined that the  principle  of
proportionality in sentencing a crime-doer is well  entrenched  in  criminal
jurisprudence. As  a  matter  of  law,  the  proportion  between  crime  and
punishment bears  the  most  relevant  influence  in  the  determination  of
sentencing the crime-doer. The court has  to  take  into  consideration  all
aspects including the social interest and  conscience  of  the  society  for
award of appropriate sentence.

25.   In State TR. P.S. Lodhi Colony, New Delhi v.  Sanjeev  Nanda[11],  one
of us (K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.), in his separate opinion, pertaining  to  the
conception of adequate sentencing, has expressed thus:

      “Law demands that the offender should be adequately punished  for  the
      crime, so that it can  deter  the  offender  and  other  persons  from
      committing similar offences.  Nature and circumstances of the offence;
      the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the  seriousness  of  the
      offence; to afford adequate deterrence to the conduct and  to  protect
      the public from such crimes are certain factors to be considered while
      imposing the sentence.”


26.   From the aforesaid authorities, it is luminous  that  this  Court  has
expressed its concern on imposition  of  adequate  sentence  in  respect  of
commission of offences regard being had to the nature  of  the  offence  and
demand of the conscience of the society. That apart, the  concern  has  been
to impose adequate sentence for the offence punishable under  Section  304-A
of the IPC.  It is  worthy  to  note  that  in  certain  circumstances,  the
mitigating factors have been taken into consideration but  the  said  aspect
is dependent on the facts of each case.  As the trend of  authorities  would
show, the  proficiency  in  professional  driving  is  emphasized  upon  and
deviation therefrom that results in rash and negligent  driving  and  causes
accident has been condemned.  In a motor accident, when a number  of  people
sustain injuries and a death occurs, it  creates  a  stir  in  the  society;
sense of fear prevails all around.   The  negligence  of  one  shatters  the
tranquility of the collective.  When such an accident  occurs,  it  has  the
effect potentiality of making  victims  in  many  a  layer  and  creating  a
concavity in the social fabric.  The  agony  and  anguish  of  the  affected
persons, both direct and vicarious, can have nightmarish effect. It has  its
impact on the society and the impact is felt more when accidents take  place
quite often because of rash driving  by  drunken,  negligent  or,  for  that
matter, adventurous drivers who have, in a way, no concern for  others.   Be
it noted, grant of compensation under the provisions of the  Motor  Vehicles
Act, 1988 is in a different sphere altogether.  Grant of compensation  under
Section 357(3) with a direction that the same should be paid to  the  person
who has suffered any loss or injury by reason  of  the  act  for  which  the
accused has been sentenced has a different contour and the same  is  not  to
be regarded as a substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence.

27. Recently, this Court in  Rattiram  &  Ors.  v.  State  of  M.P.  Through
Inspector of Police[12], though in a  different  context,  has  stated  that
criminal jurisprudence, with the passage  of  time,  has  laid  emphasis  on
victimology which fundamentally is a perception of a  trial  from  the  view
point of the criminal as well as the victim.  Both are viewed in the  social
context.  The view of the victim is given due regard and respect in  certain
countries. It is the duty of the court to see that  the  victim’s  right  is
protected.


28.   We may note with profit that an appropriate  punishment  works  as  an
eye-opener for the persons who are not careful  while  driving  vehicles  on
the road and exhibit a careless  attitude  possibly  harbouring  the  notion
that they would be shown indulgence or lives of others are  like  “flies  to
the wanton boys”.  They totally forget that the lives of many are  in  their
hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being  is  given  an  indecent
burial by their rash and negligent act.


29.   There can hardly be any cavil  that  there  has  to  be  a  proportion
between the crime and the punishment.  It is the duty of the  court  to  see
that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the  commission  of
the crime and its impact on the social order.  The  cry  of  the  collective
for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot  be  lightly  ignored.
In Siriya alias Shri Lal v. State of M.P.[13], it has been held as  follows:
-

      “Protection of society and stamping out criminal  proclivity  must  be
      the object of law which  must  be  achieved  by  imposing  appropriate
      sentence.  Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice of  “order”
      should meet the challenges confronting the society.  Friedman  in  his
      “Law  in  Changing  Society”  stated  that,  “State  of  criminal  law
      continues to be – as it should be – a decisive  reflection  of  social
      consciousness of society”.  Therefore,  in  operating  the  sentencing
      system, law should adopt the corrective machinery  or  the  deterrence
      based on factual matrix.  By deft  modulation  sentencing  process  be
      stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to
      be.”


30.   In view of the aforesaid, we have  to  weigh  whether  the  submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as regards the  mitigating
factors deserves acceptance.  Compassion is being sought on  the  ground  of
young age and mercy is being invoked on the foundation of  solemnization  of
marriage.  The date of occurrence is in  the  month  of  March,  2006.   The
scars on the collective cannot be said to  have  been  forgotten.   Weighing
the  individual  difficulty  as  against  the   social   order,   collective
conscience and the duty of the Court, we are  disposed  to  think  that  the
substantive sentence affirmed  by  the  High  Court  does  not  warrant  any
interference and, accordingly, we concur with the same.

31.   Consequently, the  appeal,  being  devoid  of  any  substance,  stands
dismissed.

                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]


                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                 [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
August  29, 2012.
-----------------------
[1]    (1995) 2 SCC 513
[2]    (1987) 1 SCC 538
[3]    (1991) 3 SCC 471
[4]    (1994) 4 SCC 353
[5]    (2000) 5 SCC 82
[6]    (2002) 3 SCC 738
[7]    (2005) 5 SCC 554
[8]    (2008) 5 SCC 730
[9]    (2012) 2 SCC 182
[10]   (2012) 2 SCC 648
[11]   2012 (7) SCALE 120
[12]   AIR 2012 SCW 1772
[13]   AIR 2008 SC 2314