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Thursday, August 9, 2012

That if the Seller applies for sale permission within the time stipulated in clause 8 above, but does not get it within 6 months, the Seller may determine this Agreement and the Seller shall refund to the Purchaser the earnest money received by him without any damages or interest, within a period of 15 days from the date of determination of the Agreement.”This, however, brings us face to face with a rather difficult situation having regard to the fact that the Agreement to Sell was executed 34 years ago on 8th September, 1978, in respect of the suit property. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that during this period the price of real estate has escalated sharply. In addition to the above, the Appellant has not suffered any material loss, since only the earnest money of Rs.50,000/- had been paid by him to the Respondents and the balance consideration was yet to be paid when the agreement came to be terminated. Even the said sum of Rs.50,000/- was returned to the Appellant immediately upon termination of the Agreement and the said amount was duly accepted by the Appellant, though by recording his objections subsequently. The Appellant, therefore, has not suffered any monetary loss, and, on the other hand, the value of the property must have sky-rocketed during the period between the execution of the Agreement till date. In fact, that is why there is no prayer in the alternative for return of any sums advanced, which is one of the usual prayers in suits for specific performance.


|REPORTABLE           |


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5787 OF 2012
                   (Arising out of SLP(C)No.13490 of 2009)



1 Rattan Lal (since deceased)


2 Through His Legal Representatives        … Appellant



           Vs.





           2 S.N. Bhalla & Anr.                       … Respondents





                               J U D G M E N T



ALTAMAS KABIR, J.


1.    Leave granted.

2.    The Respondents are perpetual Sub-lessees of  Plot  No.C-2/13,  Vasant
Vihar, New Delhi, measuring 600 sq. yards,  allotted  to  them  through  the
Government  Servants  Co-operative  House  Building  Society  Limited.  They
erected a single-storeyed structure on the  said  land  and  vide  Agreement
dated 8th September, 1978, they agreed to sell  the  said  property  to  the
Appellant together with the building erected thereon for a consideration  of
Rs.5,90,000/-. The Appellant paid a sum of Rs.50,000/-  to  the  Respondents
in advance to enable them to apply for  necessary  permission  for  transfer
and to obtain Clearance Certificate from the Tax authorities. The  Agreement
stipulated that on receipt of the said Clearance, the  Respondents  were  to
inform the Appellant of its receipt,  and,  thereafter,  the  Appellant  was
required to  complete  the  sale  within  60  days  by  paying  the  balance
consideration agreed to between the parties. In case the Respondents  failed
to apply for permission to  sell  within  15  days  from  the  date  of  the
Agreement,  the  Appellant  had  the  option  to  determine  the   Agreement
whereupon the Respondents were required to refund the earnest money  and  to
pay damages to the Appellant assessed at Rs.50,000/-.

3.    The provision in the Agreement which is  crucial  for  a  decision  in
this Appeal is Clause 9, which is extracted hereinbelow :

      “9.   That if the Seller applies for sale permission within  the  time
           stipulated in clause 8 above, but  does  not  get  it  within  6
           months, the Seller may determine this Agreement and  the  Seller
           shall refund to the Purchaser the earnest money received by  him
           without any damages or interest, within a period of 15 days from
           the date of determination of the Agreement.”

4.    Inasmuch as, the sale was not being completed by the Respondents,  the
Appellant filed Suit No.278 of 2003, in the  Court  of  Additional  District
Judge, Delhi, for specific performance of the contract.

5.    Clause 2 of the Agreement to Sell stipulates that  upon  execution  of
the  Agreement,  the  Respondents  would  immediately  apply  to  the  Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) and the  Competent  Authority  under  the  Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976,  for  permission  to  transfer  the
said property to the Purchaser/Appellant free from all  encumbrances,  after
obtaining requisite permissions  from  any  other  Body  or  Authority.   In
Clause 3 of the Agreement, the Respondents  also  undertook  to  obtain  the
Income  Tax  Clearance  Certificate  immediately  on  obtaining   the   sale
permission   from   the   concerned   authorities   and   to   inform    the
Purchaser/Appellant by Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due  accordingly.
 As indicated hereinabove, Clause 4 of  the  Agreement  stipulates  that  on
being  informed  of  the  receipt  of  the  requisite  permission  from  the
Respondents, the Appellant would have to complete the sale within  a  period
of 60 days from the  date  of  receipt  of  such  intimation  and  on  being
furnished with the copies of the permission and  the  Income  Tax  Clearance
Certificate.

6.    Clause 8 of the Agreement to Sell is of special  significance  to  the
facts of this case and is, accordingly, extracted hereinbelow :

      “8.   That if for any reason the Seller fails to apply for  permission
           to sell the said property to the Purchaser within a period of 15
           days from the date of  signing  this  Agreement,  the  Purchaser
           shall have the option to determine this Agreement  and  in  that
           event the Seller shall refund the earnest money  of  Rs.50,000/-
           (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) as received by him and pay  to  the
           Purchaser damages which are assessed as the sum  of  Rs.50,000/-
           (Rupees Fifty Thousand only).”

7.    As will be evident from the aforesaid Clause, the Purchaser was  given
the option to exit from the Agreement in case the  Seller  failed  to  apply
for permission for sale of the property within a period of 15 days from  the
date of signing of the Agreement.   Clause  9  of  the  Agreement  which  is
crucial for a decision in this appeal, contains the right of the  Seller  to
determine the Agreement and is extracted hereinbelow :

      “9.   That if the Seller applies for sale permission within  the  time
           stipulated in clause 8 above, but  does  not  get  it  within  6
           months, the Seller may determine this Agreement and  the  Seller
           shall refund to the Purchaser the earnest money received by  him
           without any damages or interest, within a period of 15 days from
           the date of determination of the Agreement.”

8.    In terms of Clause 9  of  the  Agreement  extracted  hereinabove,  the
Respondents submitted a request application in terms  of  Clause  2  of  the
said Agreement dated 12th September, 1978, i.e., well-within the  period  of
15  days  contemplated  in  the  said  Clause.   In  response  to  the  said
application made to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) for grant of  sale
permission, a letter dated 23rd/27th November, 1978, was  addressed  by  DDA
to  the  Respondents   asking   for   certain   documents   to   be   filed.
Interestingly, although, the said letter was addressed to  the  Respondents,
it was responded  to  by  the  Appellant.   The  said  letter  sent  by  the
Appellant has been marked  as  Ex.PW-1/3.   On  7th  March,  1979,  the  DDA
informed the Respondents of the decision not to  grant  sale  permission  on
the ground that the affidavit filed by Shri S.N.  Bhalla,  one  of  the  two
vendors was defective.  On receiving the said intimation from the  DDA,  the
Respondents  sent  a  telegram  to  the  Appellant  on  8th   March,   1979,
determining the Agreement to Sell in terms of Clause 9 of the Agreement,  on
the expiry of the 6 months’ period for completion of the sale on 7th  March,
1979.  The Appellant was also informed that the earnest money  paid  by  him
would be refunded within 15 days.  Pursuant  to  such  intimation,  on  12th
March, 1979, the Respondents  sent  a  Bank  Draft  of  Rs.50,000/-  to  the
Appellant, being the earnest money received in terms  of  Clause  9  of  the
Agreement to Sell dated 8th September, 1978.

9.     Coincidentally,  on  8th  March,  1979  itself,  the  Appellant  also
addressed a letter to the Respondents stating that the Lieutenant  Governor,
Delhi, had granted permission for sale of  House  No.C-2/13,  Vasant  Vihar,
New Delhi (the property in question), in favour of the Appellant.   However,
the same could not be communicated since the affidavit filed  by  Shri  S.N.
Bhalla, the Respondent No.1 herein, was  found  to  be  defective  and  such
permission could be conveyed only on production of the correct affidavit  as
required by the DDA.  The Respondents were,  accordingly  requested  by  the
Appellant to file a proper affidavit in the Department and to file  all  the
necessary documents with the DDA to enable them to convey the required  sale
permission.  It was also mentioned that the failure to do so would make  the
Respondents  responsible  for  all  costs  and  consequences  thereof.   The
original letter No. F.H.(199)78-CS/DDA dated 7th March, 1979,  was  attached
with the notice sent on behalf  of  the  Appellant.   The  said  letter  was
followed up by a telegram sent by the Appellant  indicating  that  time  was
not the essence of the Agreement and that he was prepared  to  purchase  the
house of  the  Respondents  even  beyond  the  period  of  6  months  since,
although, DDA was ready to give permission, the  Respondents  had  defaulted
in filing the correct affidavit to enable DDA to grant permission.

10.   Inasmuch as, no positive response was received by the  Appellant  from
the Respondents to his  communications,  he  sent  a  legal  notice  to  the
Respondents informing them that he was ready and  willing  to  complete  the
transaction and to have the  Sale  Deed  executed  in  his  favour  for  the
property in question by paying  the  balance  price.  The  Respondents  were
asked to inform the Appellant as to how the transaction could  be  completed
so that he could tender the sale consideration by Bank Draft.  It  was  also
indicated in the  notice  that  the  Bank  Draft  sent  by  the  Respondents
refunding the earnest money, had been encashed under  protest,  but  it  did
not mean that the  contract  was  repudiated.   The  contract  continued  to
subsist and the Appellant was always ready and willing to perform  his  part
of the contract.

11.   In the absence  of  a  positive  response  to  the  said  notice,  the
Appellant filed Suit No.278 of  2003,  on  8th  March,  1982,  for  specific
performance of the Agreement to Sell dated  8th  September,  1978.   On  the
pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled by orders  dated
1st November, 1983 and 19th February, 1991 :

      “1)   Whether the Plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform  his
           part of agreement dated 08.09.1978?


      2)     Whether  the  Defendant  has  committed  breach  of  the   said
           Agreement?


      3)    Whether the agreement  dated  08.09.1978  stands  terminated  or
           frustrated  as  alleged  by  the  defendant  and  there  is   no
           subsisting agreement to sell?


      4)    Whether the plaintiff  is  to  be  granted  relief  of  specific
           performance in the facts and circumstances of the present case?


      5)    Whether the agreement dated 08.09.1978 is void for  uncertainty?




      6)    Whether the time was the essence of the contract and whether the
           agreement dated 08.09.1978 was rightly terminated?”

      The last issue was an additional issue settled vide order  dated  19th
February, 1991.

12.   Considering Clauses 2, 8 and 9 of the  Agreement  to  Sell  dated  8th
September, 1978, the Trial  Court  dismissed  the  suit,  inter  alia,  upon
holding that the Appellant had  intentionally  and  without  demur  accepted
refund of the earnest money sent to him by Bank Draft  and,  thereafter,  he
sent the lawyer’s notice on 26th April, 1979, stating that  the  said  Draft
was encashed without prejudice to his rights and contentions  in  the  Suit.
The learned Trial Court held that  encashing  the  Bank  Draft  amounted  to
acceptance of the contract being determined.  The learned Trial  Court  also
was of the view that in view of his conduct  it  would  be  clear  that  the
Appellant had abandoned his claim under the contract and he  was  no  longer
ready and willing to pursue his remedies  under  the  contract.   The  Trial
Court also took note of the fact that although  the  Agreement  contemplated
that  the  Respondents  would  take  steps  to  obtain  the  necessary  sale
permission and the Income Tax Clearance Certificate, the  same  was  pursued
by the Appellant and that it  was  the  Appellant  who  was  in  default  in
complying with the requests made by DDA, which  had  resulted  in  the  sale
permission not being granted. The Trial Court categorically held that  there
was deficiency in respect  of  the  documents  to  be  filed.  Even  on  the
question of the Suit being filed on the last date of  limitation,  the  same
was construed to mean that the  Appellant  was  not  ready  and  willing  to
complete the sale transaction.

13.   Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned  Additional
District Judge on 10th February, 2004, the Appellant filed a  Regular  First
Appeal before the Delhi High Court, being RFA  No.272  of  2004,  which  was
dismissed by the impugned judgment.

14.   The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court  in  effect,  accepted  the
reasoning of the Trial Court and indicated further that  a  contract,  which
is by its nature determinable, is incapable of being  specifically  enforced
under Section 14(1)(c) of the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1963.   The  Division
Bench held that in terms of Clause 9 of the Agreement to Sell, the  contract
was determinable if the sale permission was not forthcoming within a  period
of 6 months from the date of  execution  of  the  Agreement.   The  Division
Bench also referred to Section 20 of the  aforesaid  Act  to  indicate  that
relief of specific performance is discretionary and  in  the  instant  case,
such discretion should not be exercised in favour of the Appellant  who  had
approached the Court on the last date of limitation, i.e.,  within  3  years
from the date when cause of action for the suit had accrued. Observing  that
it was a matter of common knowledge that between 1979 and 1982 the price  of
property had risen very sharply in Delhi, the Division Bench  also  observed
that it could not also be lost sight of that the Appellant had accepted  the
refund of Rs.50,000/-, which had been paid by  him  to  the  Respondents  as
earnest money-cum-part Sale consideration.  It  is  on  the  basis  of  such
reasoning that the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of  the  Delhi
High Court.

15.   Mr. Altaf Ahmad, learned Senior Advocate, who appeared in  support  of
the Appeal, contended that in terms of Clause 2 of the  Agreement  to  Sell,
the Sellers were under an obligation to apply to the DDA and  the  Competent
Authority under the Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976,  to
obtain the requisite permission to transfer the property to  the  Appellant,
free from all encumbrances.  Mr. Ahmad submitted that the liberty  given  to
the Respondents/Sellers under Clause 9 of the Agreement  to  exit  therefrom
could not be taken advantage of by the Sellers in case they were in  default
in obtaining the said permission within the stipulated time, without  making
serious and conscientious efforts to obtain the same.  Mr.  Ahmad  submitted
that in the instant case, the Respondents had been informed by  the  DDA  of
the deficiencies in the affidavit filed by them, but they did not  take  any
step to remove the deficiencies. Mr. Ahmad submitted that  it  is  no  doubt
true that the Appellant/Purchaser had  taken  upon  himself  the  burden  of
acquiring the sale permission and Income Tax Clearance Certificate,  but  it
was only to assist  the  Respondents  and  the  same  did  not  absolve  the
Respondents of their responsibility of performing the tasks that  they  were
required to perform under the Agreement.  Mr. Ahmad contended that the  role
played by the Appellant in  the  entire  episode  was  at  best  that  of  a
facilitator in his own interest.

16.   Mr. Ahmad submitted that both the Trial Court, as  well  as  the  High
Court, had erred in holding that the Appellant was not ready and willing  to
complete the sale transaction and the same would be evident  from  the  fact
that he filed the  suit  for  specific  performance  on  the  last  date  of
limitation.  Mr. Ahmad submitted that the very fact that the Appellant  took
on himself the burden of assisting the Respondents to procure the  necessary
sale  permission  and  Income  Tax  Clearance  Certificate,  indicated   his
willingness  and  anxiety  to  complete  the  transaction.  Learned  counsel
submitted  that  despite  the  Appellant’s  readiness  and  willingness   to
complete the sale transaction, he was unable to do  so  on  account  of  the
deficiencies  on  the  part  of  the  Respondents  in  complying  with   the
instructions of the DDA.  Learned counsel submitted  that  both  the  Courts
below had dealt with the issues in the suit without  properly  understanding
the case made out by the Appellant vis-à-vis the  terms  and  conditions  of
the Agreement to Sell dated  8th  September,  1978,  and  the  judgment  and
decree of the Trial Court as well as the judgment of  the  High  Court  were
liable to be set aside.

17.   On the other hand, appearing for the Respondents, Mr.  Mukul  Rohatgi,
learned Senior Advocate, contended that despite  the  obligation  cast  upon
the Respondents to obtain the  necessary  sale  permission  and  Income  Tax
Clearance  Certificate,  the  Appellant   had   taken   upon   himself   the
responsibility to obtain the same and the  Respondents  could  not  be  made
responsible for the Appellant’s failure to  obtain  the  same.  Mr.  Rohatgi
submitted that the Respondents/Sellers  were  fully  justified  in  invoking
Clause 9 of the Agreement to Sell and to terminate the same.

18.   In order to drive home his  point,  Mr.  Rohatgi  submitted  that  the
letters dated 27th November, 1978  and  7th  March,  1979,  which  had  been
addressed to the Respondents by the Executive Officer, DDA, requesting  that
a proper affidavit be filed in the department to  enable  the  DDA  to  take
further steps in  the  matter,  had  been  received  by  the  Appellant  and
forwarded to the Respondents in original with his letter  dated  8th  March,
1979.

19.   Mr. Rohatgi urged that from his conduct it would  be  clear  that  the
Appellant was not ready and willing  to  complete  the  sale  and  both  the
Courts had rightly dismissed the Appellant’s suit.

20.   Mr. Rohatgi referred  to  various  decisions  on  Section  20  of  the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, to bolster his submissions, but the same are  all
peculiar to the facts of each  case.   Relying  on  the  Constitution  Bench
decision of this  Court  in  Shri  Balwantrai  Chimanlal  Trivedi  Vs.  M.N.
Nagrashna and Others [(1961) 1 SCR 113], Mr. Rohatgi lastly  submitted  that
the Supreme Court is not  bound  to  interfere  under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution when dealing with an  appeal  where  there  is  no  failure  of
justice.

21.   What emerges from the submissions made on  behalf  of  the  respective
parties is that the Appellant’s suit was dismissed by  the  Trial  Court  on
the finding that he had intentionally and without  demand,  accepted  refund
of  the  earnest  money,  though,  without  prejudice  to  his  rights   and
contentions in the  suit.  The  learned  Trial  Court  also  found  that  by
encashing the Bank Draft, the Appellant had clearly indicated  that  he  was
no longer interested in completing the sale transaction.   The  Trial  Court
also took note of the fact that although under the Agreement it was for  the
Respondents  to  obtain  the  sale  permission  and  Income  Tax   Clearance
Certificate, it was the Appellant who had elected to pursue the  matter  and
was, therefore, responsible for the failure to obtain the  same  within  the
stipulated period of six months, which entitled the  Respondents/Sellers  to
terminate the Agreement under Clause 9 thereof.

22.   The High Court approved the view taken by the Trial Court, but  adding
that in view of Section 14(1)(c) of  the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1963,  the
contract, which was by its very nature determinable, was incapable of  being
specifically enforced.  The High Court, for abundant caution, also  referred
to Section 20 of the aforesaid Act to indicate that the relief  of  specific
performance was purely discretionary and dependent  on  the  facts  of  each
case.  The High Court also took note of the steep  rise  in  the  prices  of
real estate while dismissing the Appellant’s suit for specific  performance.


23.   In our view, the reasoning of  both  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High
Court, cannot be supported on several grounds. Firstly,  the  acceptance  of
refund of the earnest money paid by the Appellant  to  the  Respondents  was
not considered by the Trial Court as also  the  High  Court  in  its  proper
perspective, as both the Courts appeared to have ignored the fact that  such
refund had been accepted by the Appellant, without prejudice to  his  rights
and contentions in the suit.   That  the  said  amount  was  received  under
protest has not been considered either by the Trial Court  or  by  the  High
Court, which had relied mainly on the provisions of Clauses 2 and 9  of  the
Agreement  to  Sell  in  dismissing  the  Appellant’s  suit   for   specific
performance.  We  do  not  find  from  the  materials  on  record  that  the
Appellant had ever given up his claim under the Agreement  or  that  he  was
not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

24.    Secondly,  the  Trial  Court  also  quite  erroneously  absolved  the
Respondents  of  their  obligation  under  the  Agreement  to  obtain   sale
permission and Income Tax Clearance Certificate,  which  were  required  for
completion of the sale.  We reiterate that the role  of  the  Appellant  was
merely that of a facilitator and the primary  responsibility  for  obtaining
permission and clearance from the Income Tax Authorities remained  with  the
Respondents.  In fact, there is nothing on record to indicate  that  by  his
acts, the Appellant ever agreed  to  play  a  role  other  than  that  of  a
supportive role  and  that  too  in  his  own  interest,  in  obtaining  the
necessary clearances.

25.   The other point raised on behalf  of  the  Respondents  regarding  the
import of Clause 9 of the Agreement to sell is also not of  much  substance.
In our view Clause 9 was never meant to  provide  the  Respondents  with  an
escape route if they themselves failed to discharge their responsibility  of
not only applying for sale permission, but to  also  follow  up  the  matter
with the authorities in order to  obtain  the  same  within  the  stipulated
period of six months.  In the absence of any  material  on  record  to  show
that the Respondents had made positive efforts for procuring  the  necessary
sale permission and  clearance  certificates,  they  were  not  entitled  to
determine the Agreement in terms of Clause 9.

26.   The last point, and, in our view the most substantive  point,  is  the
steep hike in the value of real estate which has been taken note of  by  the
High Court.  However, in the absence of definite evidence to show  that  the
Appellant/purchaser  was  not  ready  and  willing  to  conclude  the   sale
transaction, the Respondents cannot be given the benefit  of  the  delay  in
concluding the same.

27.   Both the Courts below have attached a good deal of importance  to  the
fact that the Appellant filed the suit for specific performance on the  last
day of limitation, which, according to the learned  Judges,  indicated  that
the Appellant was not ready and willing to complete  the  sale  transaction,
as otherwise he would have filed the suit earlier.  We  have  no  hesitation
in rejecting the said contention, since the Appellant filed the suit  within
the period of limitation and his readiness and willingness to  conclude  the
sale transaction was quite obvious from the fact  that  he  had  taken  upon
himself  the  burden  of  pursuing  the  matter  with  the  authorities  for
obtaining sale permission and Income Tax  Clearance  Certificate.  The  role
played by the Appellant in this regard cannot, therefore, be applied to  his
disadvantage.  In our view, the approach of both the  Courts  below  to  the
problem was coloured by the fact that the Appellant  had  actively  involved
himself in the matter of obtaining the sale permission  as  well  as  Income
Tax Clearance Certificate.  The fact that the  Appellant  had  made  several
requests to the Respondents to file a proper affidavit, as requested by  the
DDA, is another indication that the  Appellant  was  ready  and  willing  to
complete the sale transaction.  Both the Courts below dealt  with  the  suit
filed by the Appellant, as though the Respondents had  no  obligation  under
the agreement for completing the sale and this appears  to  have  influenced
their judgment in dismissing the Appellant’s suit for specific  performance.


28.   Issue Nos.1, 3 and 4 as settled by the Trial Court  on  1st  November,
1983 and 19th February, 1991, are, therefore,  answered  in  favour  of  the
Appellant and the remaining issues are answered against the Respondents.  In
the light of what has been indicated hereinabove, we are of  the  view  that
the  Agreement  to  Sell  dated  8th  September,  1978,  has  been   wrongly
terminated.

29.   This, however,  brings  us  face  to  face  with  a  rather  difficult
situation having regard to the fact that the Agreement to Sell was  executed
34 years ago on 8th September, 1978, in respect of the  suit  property.   We
cannot shut our eyes to the fact that during this period the price  of  real
estate has escalated sharply.  In addition to the above, the  Appellant  has
not suffered any material loss, since only the earnest money of  Rs.50,000/-
had been paid by him to the Respondents and the  balance  consideration  was
yet to be paid when the agreement came to be terminated.  Even the said  sum
of Rs.50,000/- was returned to the Appellant  immediately  upon  termination
of the Agreement and the said amount was duly  accepted  by  the  Appellant,
though by recording his objections subsequently.  The Appellant,  therefore,
has not suffered any monetary loss, and, on the other  hand,  the  value  of
the property must have sky-rocketed during the period between the  execution
of the Agreement till date.  In fact, that is why there is no prayer in  the
alternative for return of any sums advanced,  which  is  one  of  the  usual
prayers in suits for specific performance.

30.   However, we are  also  of  the  view  that  the  Appellant  should  be
compensated for the time spent by him in pursuing his remedy in  respect  of
the Agreement to Sell.  Accordingly, we decree  the  suit,  but  instead  of
decreeing the suit for specific performance  of  the  Agreement,  we  direct
that the Respondents shall pay the Appellant costs for the litigation  right
throughout, assessed at Rs.25,00,000/-, to be paid  by  the  Respondents  to
the Appellant within one month from date, without the  Appellant  having  to
proceed  in  execution  for  recovery  of  the  same.  In  the  event,   the
Respondents fail to  pay  the  said  amount  to  the  Appellant  within  the
aforesaid period, the Appellant will be entitled  to  put  this  decree  for
costs into execution before the Trial Court and the said amount  will  carry
simple interest at the rate of 18% per annum from one month after  the  date
of the decree till its realization.

31.   The Appeal is disposed of, accordingly.




                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)





                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
Dated:8.8.2012.
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