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Monday, August 6, 2012

undergone mental torture at the hands of insensible police officials. He might have agitated to ameliorate the cause of the poor and the downtrodden, but, the social humiliation that has been meted to him is quite capable of destroying the heart of his philosophy. It has been said that philosophy has the power to sustain a man’s courage. But courage is based on self-respect and when self-respect is dented, it is difficult even for a very strong minded person to maintain that courage. The initial invincible mind paves the path of corrosion. As is perceptible, the mindset of the protectors of law appears to cause torment and insult and tyrannize the man who is helpless in custody. There can be no trace of doubt that he is bound to develop stress disorder and anxiety which destroy the brightness and strength of the will power. It has been said that anxiety and stress are slow poisons. When torment is added, it creates commotion in the mind and the slow poisons get activated. The inhuman treatment can be well visualized when the appellant came out from custody and witnessed his photograph being circulated with the self-condemning words written on it. This withers away the very essence of life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Regard being had to the various aspects which we have analysed and taking note of the totality of facts and circumstances, we are disposed to think that a sum of Rs.5.00 lacs (Rupees five lacs only) should be granted towards compensation to the appellant and, accordingly, we so direct. The said amount shall be paid by the respondent State within a period of six weeks and be realized from the erring officers in equal proportions from their salary as thought appropriate by the competent authority of the State. 47. Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         CIVIL APPEAL No.  5703/2012
                (Arising out of SLP (C) No.  34702  of 2010)


Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam                            ….. Appellant

                             Versus

State of Chattisgarh and Ors.                      … Respondents



                             J U D G M E N T





Dipak  Misra, J




      Leave granted.

2.    Albert Schweitzer, highlighting on  Glory  of  Life,  pronounced  with
conviction and humility, “the reverence of life  offers  me  my  fundamental
principle on morality”.   The aforesaid  expression  may  appear  to  be  an
individualistic  expression  of  a  great  personality,  but,  when  it   is
understood in the complete sense,  it  really  denotes,  in  its  conceptual
essentiality, and connotes, in its macrocosm, the fundamental perception  of
a thinker about the respect that life commands.  The reverence  of  life  is
insegragably associated with the dignity of a human being who  is  basically
divine,  not  servile.   A  human  personality  is  endowed  with  potential
infinity and it blossoms when dignity is sustained.  The sustenance of  such
dignity has to be the superlative concern  of  every  sensitive  soul.   The
essence of dignity can never be treated as a momentary spark  of  light  or,
for that matter, ‘a brief candle’, or ‘a hollow bubble’.  The spark of  life
gets more resplendent when man is treated  with  dignity  sans  humiliation,
for every man is expected to lead an honourable life  which  is  a  splendid
gift of “creative intelligence”. When a dent is created in  the  reputation,
humanism is paralysed.  There are some megalomaniac  officers  who  conceive
the perverse notion that they are the  `Law’  forgetting  that  law  is  the
science of what is good and just and, in very nature of  things,  protective
of a civilized society.  Reverence for the nobility of a human being has  to
be the corner stone of a body polity  that  believes  in  orderly  progress.
But, some, the incurable ones, become totally oblivious  of  the  fact  that
living with dignity has been enshrined in our Constitutional philosophy  and
it has its ubiquitous presence, and the majesty  and  sacrosanctity  dignity
cannot be allowed to be crucified  in  the  name  of  some  kind  of  police
action.

3.    The aforesaid prologue gains signification since in the case at  hand,
a doctor, humiliated in custody, sought  public  law  remedy  for  grant  of
compensation and the High Court, despite no factual  dispute,  has  required
him to submit a representation to the State Government for  adequate  relief
pertaining to grant of compensation after expiry of 19 years with a  further
stipulation that if  he  is  aggrieved  by  it,  he  can  take  recourse  to
requisite proceedings available to him under law.   We  are  pained  to  say
that this is not only asking a man  to  prefer  an  appeal  from  Caesar  to
Caesar’s wife but it also compels him like a cursed Sisyphus  to  carry  the
stone to the top of the mountain wherefrom the stone rolls down  and  he  is
obliged to repeatedly perform that futile exercise.

4.    The factual matrix as uncurtained is that the appellant, an  Ayurvedic
Doctor with B.A.M.S. degree, while practising  in  West  Chirmiri  Colliery,
Pondi area in the State  of  Chhattisgarh,  used  to  raise  agitations  and
spread awareness against exploitation of  people  belonging  to  weaker  and
marginalized sections of the society.  As a social activist, he  ushered  in
immense awareness among the down-trodden people which caused  discomfort  to
the people who had vested interest in the  coal  mine  area.   The  powerful
coal mafia, trade union leaders, police officers and other persons  who  had
fiscal interest felt disturbed and threatened  him  with  dire  consequences
and pressurized him to refrain  from  such  activities.    Embedded  to  his
committed stance, the petitioner declined to succumb to  such  pressure  and
continued the activities.  When the endeavor failed to  silence  and  stifle
the agitation that was gaining strength and momentum, a consorted  maladroit
effort was made to rope him in certain criminal offences.

5.  As the factual narration further unfolds, in the  initial  stage,  cases
under Section 110/116 of the Criminal  Procedure  Code  were  initiated  and
thereafter crime No. 15/92 under Section 420 of the Indian Penal  Code  (for
short  ‘the IPC’)  and crime No. 41/92 under Sections 427  and  379  of  the
IPC were registered.  As the activities gathered further  drive  and  became
more pronounced, crime No. 62/90 was registered for  an  offence  punishable
under Section 379 of the IPC for alleged theft of electricity.  In the  said
case, the appellant was taken into custody.

6.    Though  he  was  produced  before  the  Magistrate  on  22.9.1992  for
judicial remand and was required to be taken to  Baikunthpur  Jail,  yet  by
the time the order was passed, as it was evening, he was kept  in  the  lock
up at Manendragarh Police Station.   On 24.9.1992, he  was  required  to  be
taken to jail but instead of being taken to the jail, he was taken to  Pondi
Police Station at 9.00 a.m.  At  the  police  station,  he  was  abused  and
assaulted.  As asseverated, the physical assault was the beginning  of  ill-
treatment.  Thereafter, the SHO and ASI, the respondent Nos. 4 and  5,  took
his photograph compelling him to hold a placard on which it was written :-
           “Main Dr. M.N. Azam Chhal Kapti Evam Chor Badmash Hoon”. (I, Dr.
           M. N. Azam, am a cheat, fraud, thief and rascal).

7.    Subsequently, the said photograph was  circulated  in  general  public
and even in the revenue proceeding, the respondent No. 7 produced the  same.
 The said atrocities and the torture of the police caused tremendous  mental
agony and humiliation and, hence, the petitioner submitted  a  complaint  to
the National Human Rights Commission who, in turn, asked the  Superintendant
of Police, District Koria to submit a report.   As  there  was  no  response
from the 2nd respondent the Commission again required him to look  into  the
grievances and take  proper  action.   When  no  action  was  taken  by  the
respondent or the  police,  the  petitioner  was  compelled  to  invoke  the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Bilaspur,
Chattisgarh with a prayer for punishing the respondent Nos. 4, 5 & 7 on  the
foundation that their action was a complete transgression  of  human  rights
which affected his fundamental right  especially  his  right  to  live  with
dignity as enshrined under Article 21 of  the  Constitution.   In  the  Writ
Petition, prayer was made for awarding compensation to the tune  of  Rs.  10
lakhs.

8.    After the  return  was  filed,  the  learned  single  Judge  passed  a
detailed order on  3.1.2003  that  the  Chief  Secretary  and  the  Director
General of Police should take appropriate steps for issue  of  direction  to
the concerned authorities to take  appropriate  action  in  respect  of  the
erring  officers.   Thereafter,  some  developments  took   place   and   on
24.3.2005, the Court recorded that  the  writ  petitioner  was  arrested  on
22.9.1992 and his photograph was taken at the police station.   The  learned
single Judge referred to Rule 1 of  Regulation  92  of  Chhattisgarh  Police
Regulations which lays down that no Magistrate shall order photograph  of  a
convict or other person to be  taken  by  the  police  for  the  purpose  of
Identification under Prisoners Act, 1920, unless he is satisfied  that  such
photograph is required for circulation to different places  or  for  showing
it for the purpose of identification to  a  witness  who  cannot  easily  be
brought to a test identification at the place  where  the  investigation  is
conducted or that photograph is required to  be  preserved  as  a  permanent
record.  Thereafter, the learned single Judge proceeded to record  that  not
only the photograph of the writ petitioner had been taken with  the  placard
but had also been circulated which had caused great mental agony and  trauma
to his school going children.  Thereafter, he referred to Regulation 737  of
the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations which relates to action to be  taken  by
the superior officer in respect of  an  erring  officer  who  ill-treats  an
accused.

9.    After referring  to  various  provisions,  the  learned  single  Judge
called for a report from the Chief Secretary.  On 18.11.2005, the Court  was
apprised that despite several communications, the Chief  Secretary  had  not
yet sent the report.  Eventually, the report  was  filed  stating  that  the
appellant was involved in certain cases including  grant  of  bogus  medical
certificate and regard being had to the directions issued in 1992  that  the
photograph of the offender should be kept on record, the same was taken  and
affixed against his name and  after  7.9.1992,   it  was  removed  from  the
records.  It was  also  stated  that  the  Sub-Inspector  had  been  imposed
punishment of “censure” by the Superintendent of Police on  19.11.2001.   It
was also set forth that on 3.5.2003, a charge-sheet was served  on  all  the
erring officers and a departmental enquiry was  held  and  in  the  ultimate
eventuate, they had been imposed major penalty of withholding of one  annual
increment with cumulative effect for one year  commencing  27.5.2004.   That
apart, on 19.7.2005, a case had been registered  under  Section  29  of  the
Police Act against the erring officers.

10.   It is apt to note here that when  the  matter  was  listed  for  final
hearing for grant of compensation, the learned  single  Judge  referred  the
matter to be heard by a Division Bench.

11.   The Division Bench referred to the prayer clause  and  various  orders
passed by the learned single Judge and eventually directed the appellant  to
submit a representation to the Chief Secretary for  grant  of  compensation.
We think it appropriate to reproduce the relevant paragraphs  of  the  order
passed by the Division Bench: -

           “4.   Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during the
           pendency of  the  writ  petition,  Relief  Clause  No.  7.3  was
           fulfilled under the directions of this court and  now  only  the
           compensation  part,  as  claimed  in  Relief  Clause  No.  7.5A,
           remained there.

           5.    In the instant case, it is an admitted position  that  the
           respondent  State  authorities  have  taken  cognizance  of  the
           harassment meted out to the petitioner by the  erring  personnel
           of the police  department  and  initiated  departmental  enquiry
           against them in which they were found guilty and punishment  has
           also been awarded to them.”

12.   After issuing notice, this Court, on 17.2.2012,  thought  it  apposite
that the appellant should submit a representation within a week which  shall
be considered by the respondents within four weeks therefrom.

13.   In pursuance  of  the  aforesaid  order,  the  appellant  submitted  a
representation which has been rejected on 19.3.2012  by  the  OSD/Secretary,
Government of Chhattisgarh, Home  (Police)  Department.   In  the  rejection
order, it has been stated as follows: -

                 “In  the  aforesaid  cases,  the  arrest  and  the  action
           regarding submission of chargesheet in the Hon’ble Court was  in
           accordance with law.

           (2)   On 24.9.92 the police officers taking your photograph  and
           writing  objectionable  words  thereon  was  against  the  legal
           procedure.  Considering  this,  action  was  taken  against  the
           concerned guilty police officers in accordance with law and  two
           police officers were punished.

           (3)   In your representation, compensation has been demanded  on
           the following two grounds:

           A.    Defamation was caused due to the  police  officers  taking
           photograph.

           B.    Your wife became unwell mentally.  She is still unwell.

           C.    Difficulty in marriage of daughter.

                 Regarding the aforesaid grounds, the actual position is as
           follows:

           A.    Defamation is such a subject, the  decision  on  which  is
                 within jurisdiction of the competent  court.   No  decision
                 pertaining to defamation has been received from  the  court
                 of competent jurisdiction.   Therefore,  it  would  not  be
                 proper for the State Government to take a decision in  this
                 regard.

           B.    Regarding mental ailment of your wife, no such  basis  has
                 been submitted by you, on the basis of which any conclusion
                 may be drawn.

           C.    On the point of there being no marriage of  children  also
                 no such document or  evidence  has  been  produced  by  you
                 before the Government along with the representation, on the
                 basis of which any decision may be taken.

                 Therefore, in the light of the above, the State Government
           hereby rejects your representation and accordingly decides  your
           representation.”

14.   Mr.  Niraj  Sharma,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant,
submitted that when the conclusion has been arrived at  that  the  appellant
was harassed at the hands of the police officers  and  in  the  departmental
enquiry they have been found guilty and punished, just  compensation  should
have been awarded by the High Court.  It is further urged by him  that  this
Court had directed to submit a representation to  grant  an  opportunity  to
the functionaries of the  State  to  have  a  proper  perceptual  shift  and
determine the amount of compensation and grant the same,  but  the  attitude
of indifference reigned supreme  and  no  fruitful  result  ensued.   It  is
canvassed by him that it would  not  only  reflect  the  non-concern  for  a
citizen who has been humiliated at the police station, but,  the  manner  in
which the representation has been rejected clearly  exhibits  the  imprudent
perception and heart of stone  of the State.  It is argued that the  reasons
ascribed by the State authority that defamation is such a subject  that  the
issue of compensation has to be decided by the competent court  and  in  the
absence of such a  decision,  the  Government  cannot  take  a  decision  as
regards  the  compensation  clearly  reflects  the  deliberate   insensitive
approach to the entire  fact  situation  inasmuch  as  the  High  Court,  in
categorical terms,  had  found  that  the  allegations  were  true  and  the
appellant was harassed and thereby it did tantamount  to  custodial  torture
and there was no justification to adopt a hyper-technical mode to  treat  it
as a case of defamation in the ordinary sense of the term and requiring  the
appellant to take recourse to further  adjudicatory  process  and  obtain  a
decree from the civil court.

15.   Mr. Atul Jha, learned counsel appearing for the State,  has  supported
the order of the High Court as well as the order  passed  by  the  competent
authority  of  the  State  who  has  rejected  the  representation  on   the
foundation that when the appellant puts forth a claim  for  compensation  on
the ground of defamation, he has to take recourse to the  civil  court  and,
therefore, no fault can be found with the decision taken either by the  High
Court or the subsequent rejection of the representation by the authority  of
the State.

16.    The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  private  respondents  has
submitted that they have already been punished in a disciplinary  proceeding
and, therefore, the question of grant of compensation  does  not  arise  and
even if it emerges, the same has to be determined by the civil court on  the
base of evidence adduced to establish defamation.

17.   At the very outset, we are obliged to  state  that  five  aspects  are
clear as day and do not remotely admit of any doubt.  First,  the  appellant
was arrested in respect of the alleged  offence  under  Indian  Penal  Code,
1860 and the Electricity Act, 2003; second, there was  a  direction  by  the
Magistrate for judicial remand and thereafter instead of taking him to  jail
the next day he was brought to the police station;  third,  self-humiliating
words were written  on  the  placard  and  he  was  asked  to  hold  it  and
photographs were taken; and  fourth,  the  photographs  were  circulated  in
general public and were also filed by one of the respondents  in  a  revenue
proceeding; and five,  the High Court, in categorical terms, has found  that
the appellant was harassed.

18.   In the aforesaid backdrop, the singular question required to be  posed
is that whether the appellant should be asked to  initiate  a  civil  action
for grant of damages on the foundation that he  has  been  defamed  or  this
Court should grant compensation on the bedrock that he has been harassed  in
police custody.

19.   At this juncture, it is condign to refer  to  certain  authorities  in
the field.  In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B.[1] it has been held thus: -

           “10.  “Torture” has not been defined in the Constitution  or  in
           other penal laws. “Torture” of a human being  by  another  human
           being is essentially an instrument to impose  the  will  of  the
           “strong” over the “weak” by suffering.  The word  torture  today
           has  become  synonymous  with   the   darker   side   of   human
           civilization.

                       “Torture is a wound  in  the  soul  so  painful  that
                 sometimes you can almost  touch  it,  but  it  is  also  so
                 intangible that there is no way to  heal  it.   Torture  is
                 anguish squeezing in your chest, cold as ice and heavy as a
                 stone, paralyzing as sleep and dark as the abyss.   Torture
                 is despair and fear and rage and hate.  It is a  desire  to
                 kill and destroy including yourself.”

                                                         - Adriana P. Bartow




           11.   No violation of any one of the human rights has  been  the
           subject of so many Conventions and Declarations as  “torture”  –
           all aiming at total banning of it in all forms, but in spite  of
           the commitments made to eliminate torture, the fact remains that
           torture is more widespread now  than  ever  before.   “Custodial
           torture” is a naked violation of human dignity  and  degradation
           which  destroys,  to  a  very  large  extent,   the   individual
           personality.  It is a calculated assault on  human  dignity  and
           whenever human dignity is wounded,  civilization  takes  a  step
           backward – flag of humanity must on each such occasion fly half-
           mast.


           12.   In all custodial crimes what is of  real  concern  is  not
           only infliction of body pain but the mental agony which a person
           undergoes within the four walls of police  station  or  lock-up.
           Whether it is physical assault or rape in  police  custody,  the
           extent of trauma, a person experiences is beyond the purview  of
           law.”

20.   We have referred to the aforesaid paragraphs to  highlight  that  this
Court has emphasized on the  concept  of  mental  agony  when  a  person  is
confined within the four walls of police station or lock-up.   Mental  agony
stands in contradistinction to infliction of physical  pain.   In  the  said
case,  the  two-Judge  Bench  referred  to  Article  5  of   the   Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 which  provides  that  “No  one  shall  be
subjected to  torture  or  to  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or
punishment”.  Thereafter, the Bench adverted to Article 21 and proceeded  to
state that the expression “life  or  personal  liberty”  has  been  held  to
include the right to live  with  human  dignity  and  thus,  it  would  also
include within itself a guarantee against torture and assault by  the  State
or  its  functionaries.   Reference  was  made  to  Article  20(3)  of   the
Constitution which postulates that a person accused of an offence shall  not
be compelled to be a witness against himself.

21.   It is worthy to note that in  the  case  of  D.K.  Basu  (supra),  the
concern shown by this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.[2] was  taken
note of.  In Joginder Kumar’s case, this Court voiced its concern  regarding
complaints of violation of human rights during and after arrest.  It is  apt
to quote a passage from the same: -

                 “The horizon of human rights is expanding.   At  the  same
           time, the crime rate is also increasing.  Of  late,  this  Court
           has been receiving complaints about violations of  human  rights
           because of indiscriminate arrests.   How  are  we  to  strike  a
           balance between the two?

                 A realistic approach should be  made  in  this  direction.
           The law  of  arrest  is  one  of  balancing  individual  rights,
           liberties and  privileges,  on  the  one  hand,  and  individual
           duties,  obligations  and  responsibilities  on  the  other;  of
           weighing and balancing the rights, liberties and  privileges  of
           the single individual and those of individuals collectively;  of
           simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the  weight  and
           the emphasis; of deciding which comes first –  the  criminal  or
           society, the law violator or the law abider…”

22.   After referring to the case of Joginder Kumar (supra), A.S. Anand,  J.
(as his Lordship then was), dealing with the various facets of  Article  21,
stated that any form of torture or cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment
would fall within the ambit of Article 21 of the  Constitution,  whether  it
occurs  during  investigation,   interrogation   or   otherwise.    If   the
functionaries of the Government become law-breakers, it is  bound  to  breed
contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every  man  would  have
the tendency to become law unto himself  thereby  leading  to  anarchy.   No
civilized nation can permit that to happen, for a citizen does not shed  off
his fundamental right to life, the moment  a  policeman  arrests  him.   The
right to life of a citizen cannot put  in  abeyance  on  his  arrest.    The
precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India  cannot
be denied to convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in  custody,
except according to  the  procedure  established  by  law  by  placing  such
reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law.

23.   At this juncture, it becomes absolutely necessary to  appreciate  what
is meant by the term “harassment”.  In P.  Ramanatha  Aiyar’s  Law  Lexicon,
Second Edition, the term “harass” has been defined, thus: -

           “Harass. “injure” and “injury” are  words  having  numerous  and
           comprehensive popular  meanings,  as  well  as  having  a  legal
           import.  A line may be drawn between these words  and  the  word
           “harass” excluding the latter from being comprehended within the
           word “injure” or “injury”.  The synonyms  of  “harass”  are:  To
           weary, tire, perplex,  distress  tease,  vex,  molest,  trouble,
           disturb.  They all have relation  to  mental  annoyance,  and  a
           troubling of the spirit.”

The term “harassment”  in  its  connotative  expanse  includes  torment  and
vexation.  The term “torture” also engulfs  the  concept  of  torment.   The
word “torture” in its denotative concept includes mental  and  psychological
harassment.   The  accused  in  custody  can   be   put   under   tremendous
psychological pressure by cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

24.   At this juncture, we may  refer  with  profit  to  a  two-Judge  Bench
decision  in  Sunil  Gupta  and  others  v.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  and
others[3].  The said case pertained to handcuffing where the  accused  while
in judicial custody were being escorted to court  from  jail  and  bound  in
fetters.  In that context, the Court stated that  the  escort  party  should
record reasons for doing so in writing and intimate the court  so  that  the
court, considering the circumstances may either approve  or  disapprove  the
action of the escort  party  and  issue  necessary  directions.   The  Court
further observed that when the  petitioners  who  had  staged  ‘Dharna’  for
public cause and voluntarily submitted themselves for arrest and who had  no
tendency to escape, had been subjected to humiliation by  being  handcuffed,
such act of the escort party is against all  norms  of  decency  and  is  in
utter violation of the principle underlying Article 21 of  the  Constitution
of India.  The said act was condemned by this  Court  to  be  arbitrary  and
unreasonably humiliating towards the  citizens  of  this  country  with  the
obvious motive of pleasing ‘someone’.

25.   In Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of J &  K[4],  this  Court  expressed  the
view that the police officers  should  have  greatest  regard  for  personal
liberty of citizens as they are the custodians of law and order and,  hence,
they should not flout the law by stooping to bizarre  acts  of  lawlessness.
It was  observed  that  custodians  of  law  and  order  should  not  become
depredators of civil liberties, for their duty is  to  protect  and  not  to
abduct.

26.   It needs no special emphasis to state  that  when  an  accused  is  in
custody, his Fundamental Rights are not  abrogated  in  toto.   His  dignity
cannot be allowed to be comatosed.   The  right  to  life  is  enshrined  in
Article 21 of the Constitution and a fortiorari, it includes  the  right  to
live with human dignity and all that goes along with it.   It  has  been  so
stated in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of  Delhi
and others[5] and D.K. Basu  (supra).

27.   In Kharak Singh  v.  State  of  U.  P.,[6]  this  court  approved  the
observations of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois[7]:-

           “By the term “life” as here [Article 21] used something more  is
           meant than mere animal existence.  The  inhibition  against  its
           deprivation extends to all those limbs and  faculties  by  which
           life is enjoyed.”

28.   It is apposite to note that inhuman treatment has many  a  facet.   It
fundamentally can  cover  such  acts  which  have  been  inflicted  with  an
intention to cause physical suffering or severe mental pain.  It would  also
include a treatment that is inflicted that causes humiliation and compels  a
person to act against his will or conscience.

29.   In Arvinder Singh Bagga v. State of U.P. and others[8],  it  has  been
opined that torture is not merely physical but may even  consist  of  mental
and psychological torture calculated to  create  fright  to  submit  to  the
demands of the police.

30.   At this stage, it is seemly to refer to the decisions of some  of  the
authorities relating to a man’s reputation which forms a facet of  right  to
life as engrafted under Article 21 of the Constitution.

31.   In Smt. Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and another[9], this  Court
reproduced an observation from the decision in D. F. Marion v. Davis[10]:-

           “The right to enjoyment of a private reputation,  unassailed  by
           malicious slander is of ancient  origin,  and  is  necessary  to
           human society. A good  reputation  is  an  element  of  personal
           security, and is protected by the Constitution equally with  the
           right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and property.”

32.    In  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Port  of   Bombay   v.   Dilipkumar
Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others[11], it has been  ruled  that  right  to
reputation is a facet of right to life of a citizen under Article 21 of  the
Constitution.

33.   In Smt. Selvi and others v.  State  of  Karnataka[12],  while  dealing
with  the  involuntary  administration  of  certain  scientific  techniques,
namely,  narcoanalysis,  polygraph  examination  and  the  Brain  Electrical
Activation Profile test for the purpose of improving  investigation  efforts
in  criminal  cases,  a  three-Judge  Bench  opined  that   the   compulsory
administration of the impugned  techniques  constitute  ‘cruel,  inhuman  or
degrading treatment’ in the context of Article 21.   Thereafter,  the  Bench
adverted to what is the popular  perception  of  torture  and  proceeded  to
state as follows: -

           “The popular perceptions of terms such as ‘torture’ and  ‘cruel,
           inhuman or degrading treatment’ are associated with gory  images
           of blood-letting and broken bones.  However, we  must  recognize
           that a forcible intrusion into a person’s  mental  processes  is
           also an affront to human dignity and liberty, often  with  grave
           and long-lasting consequences.  [A similar conclusion  has  been
           made in the following paper: Marcy Strauss, ‘Criminal Defence in
           the Age of Terrorism – Torture’, 48  New  York  Law  School  Law
           Review 201-274 (2003/2004)].”

After so stating, the Bench in its conclusion recorded as follows: -

           “We have also elaborated how the  compulsory  administration  of
           any of these techniques is an  unjustified  intrusion  into  the
           mental privacy of  an  individual.   It  would  also  amount  to
           ‘cruel, inhuman or  degrading  treatment’  with  regard  to  the
           language of evolving international human rights norms.”

34.   Recently in Vishwanath S/o Sitaram Agrawal v.  Sau.  Sarla  Vishwanath
Agrawal[13], although in a different context, while dealing with the  aspect
of reputation, this Court has observed as follows: -

           “……..reputation which is not only the salt of life, but also the
           purest treasure and the most precious perfume of  life.   It  is
           extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of the grave.
            It is a revenue generator for the present as well  as  for  the
           posterity.”



35.   We have referred to  these  paragraphs  to  understand  how  with  the
efflux  of  time,  the  concept  of  mental  torture  has  been   understood
throughout the world, regard being had to the essential conception of  human
dignity.

36.   From the aforesaid discussion, there is no shadow of  doubt  that  any
treatment  meted  to  an  accused  while  he  is  in  custody  which  causes
humiliation and mental trauma corrodes the concept of  human  dignity.   The
majesty of law protects the dignity of a citizen in a  society  governed  by
law.  It cannot be forgotten that the Welfare State is governed by  rule  of
law which has paramountcy.  It has been said by Edward Biggon “the  laws  of
a  nation  form  the  most  instructive  portion  of   its   history.”   The
Constitution as the organic law of the land has unfolded itself in  manifold
manner like a living organism in the various decisions of  the  court  about
the rights of a person under Article 21 of the Constitution of  India.  When
citizenry rights are  sometimes  dashed  against  and  pushed  back  by  the
members of City Halls, there has to be a rebound and when the rebound  takes
place, Article 21 of the Constitution springs up to action as  a  protector.
That is why,  an  investigator  to  a  crime  is  required  to  possess  the
qualities of patience  and  perseverance  as  has  been  stated  in  Nandini
Sathpaty v. P. L. Dani[14].

37.   In Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of Gujarat[15],  while
dealing with the role of police, this Court condemned the excessive  use  of
force by the police and observed as follows:-

           “The main objectives of police is  to  apprehend  offenders,  to
           investigate crimes and to prosecute them before the  courts  and
           also to prevent commission of crime and above all to ensure  law
           and order to protect  citizens’  life  and  property.   The  law
           enjoins the police to be scrupulously fair to the  offender  and
           the Magistracy is to ensure fair investigation and fair trial to
           an offender.  The purpose and object of  Magistracy  and  police
           are complementary to each other.  It is unfortunate  that  these
           objectives have remained unfulfilled even after 40 years of  our
           Constitution.   Aberrations  of  police  officers   and   police
           excesses in dealing with the law and order situation  have  been
           subject of adverse comments from this  Court  as  well  as  from
           other courts but it has failed to have any corrective effect  on
           it.  The police has  power  to  arrest  a  person  even  without
           obtaining a warrant of arrest from a court.   The  amplitude  of
           this power casts an obligation on the police and it must bear in
           mind, as held by this Court that if a person is arrested  for  a
           crime, his constitutional and fundamental  rights  must  not  be
           violated.”

38.    It is imperative to state that it  is  the  sacrosanct  duty  of  the
police authorities to remember that  a  citizen  while  in  custody  is  not
denuded of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.   The
restrictions imposed have the sanction of law  by  which  his  enjoyment  of
fundamental right is curtailed but his basic human rights are  not  crippled
so that the police officers can treat him in  an  inhuman  manner.   On  the
contrary, they are under obligation to protect his human rights and  prevent
all forms of atrocities.  We may hasten to add that  a  balance  has  to  be
struck and, in this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage  from  D.  K.
Basu (supra): -

            “There can be no gainsaying that freedom of an  individual  must
            yield to the security of the State.   The  right  of  preventive
            detention of individuals in the  interest  of  security  of  the
            State in various situations prescribed under different  statutes
            has been upheld by the Courts.  The  right  to  interrogate  the
            detenus, culprits or arrestees in the interest  of  the  nation,
            must take precedence over  an  individual’s  right  to  personal
            liberty.   …….…The action of the State, however, must be “right,
            just and fair”.  Using any form of torture  for  extracting  any
            kind of information would neither be ‘right nor just  nor  fair’
            and, therefore,  would  be  impermissible,  being  offensive  to
            Article 21.  Such a crime-suspect  must  be  interrogated-indeed
            subjected to sustain and scientific interrogation-determined  in
            accordance with the provisions of law.  He cannot,  however,  be
            tortured or subjected to third degree methods or eliminated with
            a view to  elicit  information,  extract  confession  or  derive
            knowledge   about   his   accomplishes,   weapons   etc.     His
            constitutional right cannot be abridged  except  in  the  manner
            permitted by law, though in the  very  nature  of  things  there
            would be qualitative difference in the method  of  interrogation
            of such a person as compared to an ordinary criminal.”

39.   In the case at hand, the appellant, while in  custody,  was  compelled
to hold a  placard  in  which  condemning  language  was  written.   He  was
photographed with the said placard and the photograph was made  public.   It
was also filed in a revenue proceeding by  the  7th  respondent.   The  High
Court has recorded that the competent authority of the State  has  conducted
an enquiry and found the erring officers to be guilty.  The High  Court  has
recorded the findings in the favour of the appellant but left him to  submit
a representation to the concerned authorities.   This  Court,  as  has  been
indicated earlier, granted an opportunity to the  State  to  deal  with  the
matter in an appropriate manner  but  it  rejected  the  representation  and
stated that it is not a case of defamation.  We may at once clarify that  we
are not at all concerned with defamation as postulated under Section 499  of
the IPC.  We are really concerned how in a country governed by rule  of  law
and where Article 21 of the  Constitution  is  treated  to  be  sacred,  the
dignity and social reputation of a citizen has been affected.

40.   As we perceive, from the admitted  facts  borne  out  on  record,  the
appellant has been humiliated.  Such  treatment  is  basically  inhuman  and
causes mental trauma.    In “Kaplan  &  Sadock’s  Synopsis  of  Psychiatry”,
while  dealing  with  torture,  the  learned  authors   have   stated   that
intentional physical and psychological torture of one human by  another  can
have emotionally damaging effects comparable to, and  possibly  worse  than,
those seen with  combat  and  other  types  of  trauma.   Any  psychological
torture inflicts immense mental pain.  A mental  suffering  at  any  age  in
life can carry the brunt and may have  nightmarish  effect  on  the  victim.
The hurt develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness and  his  self-respect
gets gradually  atrophied.   We  have  referred  to  such  aspects  only  to
highlight that in the case at hand, the  police  authorities  possibly  have
some kind of sadistic pleasure or to “please someone”  meted  the  appellant
with this kind of treatment.  It is not to be forgotten  that  when  dignity
is lost, the breath of life gets into oblivion.  In a  society  governed  by
rule of law where humanity has to be a  laser  beam,  as  our  compassionate
constitution has so emphasized,  the  police  authorities  cannot  show  the
power or prowess to vivisect and dismember the same.    When they pave  such
path, law cannot become a silent spectator.   As Pithily stated in  Jennison
v. Baker[16]:-

           “The law should not be seen to sit by limply,  while  those  who
           defy if go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope.”


41.   Presently, we shall advert to the aspect  of  grant  of  compensation.
The learned counsel for the  State,  as  has  been  indicated  earlier,  has
submitted  with  immense  vehemence  that  the  appellant  should  sue   for
defamation.   Our  analysis  would  clearly  show  that  the  appellant  was
tortured while he was in custody.  When  there  is  contravention  of  human
rights, the inherent concern as envisaged in Article 21 springs to life  and
enables the citizen to seek relief by taking recourse to public law remedy.

42.   In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to Nilabati  Behera  v.  State
or Orissa[17] wherein it has been held thus: -

           “A claim in public law for  compensation  for  contravention  of
           human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection  of  which
           is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for
           enforcement and protection of such  rights,  and  such  a  claim
           based on strict liability made by resorting to a  constitutional
           remedy provided for the enforcement of a  fundamental  right  is
           ‘distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy  in  private  law
           for damages for the tort’ resulting from  the  contravention  of
           the fundamental right.  The defence of sovereign immunity  being
           inapplicable,  and  alien  to  the  concept  of   guarantee   of
           fundamental rights, there can be no question of such  a  defence
           being available  in  the  constitutional  remedy.   It  is  this
           principle which justifies award  of  monetary  compensation  for
           contravention  of   fundamental   rights   guaranteed   by   the
           Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of  redress
           available for  the  contravention  made  by  the  State  or  its
           servants  in  the  purported  exercise  of  their  powers,   and
           enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the
           remedy in public law  under  the  Constitution  by  recourse  to
           Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.”

43.   Dr. A.S. Anand J., (as his  Lordship  then  was),  in  his  concurring
opinion, expressed that the relief of monetary  compensation,  as  exemplary
damages, in proceedings under Article 32  by  the  Supreme  Court  or  under
Article  226  by  the  High  Courts  for  established  infringement  of  the
indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21  is  a  remedy  available  in
public law and is based on the strict liability  for  contravention  of  the
guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the  citizen.   The  purpose  of
public law is not only to civilize public  power  but  also  to  assure  the
citizen that they live under a legal system  which  aims  to  protect  their
interests and preserve their rights.  Therefore, when the court  moulds  the
relief by granting ‘compensation’ in proceedings under  Article  32  or  226
seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it  does  so  under
the public law by way of penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing  the  liability
for the public wrong on the State which has failed in  its  public  duty  to
protect the fundamental rights of the citizen.  The payment of  compensation
in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally  understood  in  a
civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader  sense  of
providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’  under  the  public
law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, by not  protecting  the
fundamental rights of the citizen.  The compensation is  in  the  nature  of
‘exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrongdoer  for  the  breach  of  its
public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the  aggrieved
party to claim compensation under the private law  in  an  action  based  on
tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction  or/and
prosecute the offender under the penal law.

44.   In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana[18],  a  three-Judge  Bench  of  the
Apex Court,  after  referring  to  its  earlier  decisions,  has  opined  as
follows: -

           “It is thus now well settled that award of compensation  against
           the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for redress  of
           an established infringement of a fundamental right under Article
           21, by a public servant.   The  quantum  of  compensation  will,
           however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of  each  case.
           Award of such compensation (by way of public  law  remedy)  will
           not come in the way of the aggrieved person claiming  additional
           compensation in a civil court, in enforcement of the private law
           remedy in tort, nor come  in  the  way  of  the  criminal  court
           ordering  compensation  under  Section  357  of  Code  of  Civil
           Procedure.”

45.   At this stage, we may fruitfully refer  to  the  decision  in  Hardeep
Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh.[19]   The appellant  therein  was  engaged
in running a coaching centre where students were given  tuition  to  prepare
for  entrance  test  for  different  professional   courses.    On   certain
allegation, he was arrested  and  taken  to  police  station  where  he  was
handcuffed by the police without there being any valid reason.  A number  of
daily newspapers published the appellant’s photographs  and  on  seeing  his
photograph in handcuffs, the appellant’s elder sister was  so  shocked  that
she expired.  After a long and delayed trial, the appellant, Hardeep  Singh,
filed a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya  Pradesh  at  Jabalpur
that the prosecution purposefully caused delay in conclusion  of  the  trial
causing harm to his dignity and reputation.  The learned single  Judge,  who
dealt with the matter, did not find any ground to  grant  compensation.   On
an appeal being preferred, the Division Bench observed that  an  expeditious
trial ending in acquittal  could  have  restored  the  appellant’s  personal
dignity but the  State  instead  of  taking  prompt  steps  to  examine  the
prosecution witnesses delayed the trial for five long years.   The  Division
Bench further held there was no warrant for putting  the  handcuffs  on  the
appellant which adversely affected his dignity.  Be it noted,  the  Division
Bench granted compensation of Rs. 70,000/-.  This Court, while dealing  with
the facet of compensation, held thus:-

           “Coming, however, to the issue of compensation, we find that  in
           light of the findings arrived at  by  the  Division  Bench,  the
           compensation of Rs. 70,000/-  was  too  small  and  did  not  do
           justice to the  sufferings  and  humiliation  undergone  by  the
           appellant.  In the facts and circumstances of the case, we  feel
           that a sum of Rs. 2,00,00/-  (Rupees  Two  Lakhs)  would  be  an
           adequate compensation for the appellant and would meet the  ends
           of justice.  We, accordingly, direct the State of Madhya Pradesh
           to pay to the appellant the sum  of  Rs.  2,00,000/-(rupees  Two
           Lakhs) as compensation.  In  case  the  sum  of  Rs.70,000/-  as
           awarded by  the  High  Court,  has  already  been  paid  to  the
           appellant, the State would naturally pay only the balance amount
           of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees One Lakh thirty thousand)”.

Thus, suffering and humiliation were highlighted and amount of  compensation
was enhanced.

46.   On a reflection of the facts of the case,  it  is  luculent  that  the
appellant had undergone mental torture at the  hands  of  insensible  police
officials.  He might have agitated to ameliorate the cause of the  poor  and
the downtrodden, but, the social humiliation that has been meted to  him  is
quite capable of destroying the heart of his philosophy.  It has  been  said
that philosophy has the power to sustain a man’s courage.   But  courage  is
based on self-respect and when self-respect is dented, it is difficult  even
for a very strong minded person  to  maintain  that  courage.   The  initial
invincible mind paves the path of corrosion. As is perceptible, the  mindset
of the protectors of law appears to cause torment and insult  and  tyrannize
the man who is helpless in custody.  There can be no trace of doubt that  he
is  bound  to  develop  stress  disorder  and  anxiety  which  destroy   the
brightness and strength of the will power.  It has been  said  that  anxiety
and stress are  slow poisons.  When torment is added, it  creates  commotion
in the mind and the slow poisons get activated.  The inhuman  treatment  can
be well visualized when the appellant came out from  custody  and  witnessed
his photograph being circulated with the self-condemning  words  written  on
it.  This withers away the very essence of life as enshrined  under  Article
21 of the Constitution.  Regard being had to the various  aspects  which  we
have analysed and taking note of the totality of  facts  and  circumstances,
we are disposed to think that a sum of Rs.5.00 lacs (Rupees five lacs  only)
should be granted towards compensation to the  appellant  and,  accordingly,
we so direct.  The said amount shall be paid by the respondent State  within
a period of six weeks and be realized from  the  erring  officers  in  equal
proportions from their  salary  as  thought  appropriate  by  the  competent
authority of the State.

47.   Consequently, the appeal is allowed to  the  extent  indicated  above.
However, in the facts and circumstances of  the  case,  there  shall  be  no
order as to costs.




                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]



                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
August  03, 2012.
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[1]    AIR 1997 SC 610 : (1997) 1 SCC 416
[2]    (1994) 4 SCC 260
[3]   [4] (1990) 3 SCC 119
[5]    (1985) 4 SCC 677
[6]    (1981) 1 SCC 608
[7]    (1964) 1 SCR 332
[8]    (1877) 94 US 113
[9]    AIR 1995 SC 117
[10]     (1989) 1 SCC 494
[11]    55 ALR 171
[12]    (1983) 1 SCC 124
[13]   AIR 2010 SC 1974
[14]   2012 (6) SCALE 190
[15]    AIR 1978  SC 1025
[16]    (1991) 4 SCC 406
[17]    (1972) 1 All ER 997, 1006
[18]   (1993) 2 SCC 746
[19]   AIR 2006 SC 1117
[20]    (2012) 1 SCC 748