LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Saturday, December 15, 2012

Mr. Ashok Kumar Nigam, respondent herein was appointed as District Government Counsel on 17th September, 2004 vide a notification issued by the State Government. The term of the said respondent was renewed on 3rd March, 2006 for a period of one year and as such his term came to an end on 5th March, 2007. The respondent submitted his application for renewal of his term on 19th January, 2007. The District Judge, Lucknow on 26th February, 2007 gave his report and the District Magistrate also submitted his report on 5th March, 2007 recommending the renewal of the term of the respondent. However, the State Government, appellant herein, vide order dated 3rd April, 2008 refused his renewal which resulted in cancellation of engagement of the said respondent.



                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.      9029      OF 2012
               (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 35279 of 2009)


State of U.P. & Ors.                               … Appellants

                                   Versus

Ashok Kumar Nigam                            … Respondent

                                  WITH

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.     9030         OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24562 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.        9031      OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24563 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.    9032          OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24564 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.       9033       OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35561 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.     9034         OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35562 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.        9035      OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35569 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.    9036          OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35568 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.     9037         OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35567 of 2010]


                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.     9038         OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35566 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.        9039      OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35565 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.     9040         OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 9156 of 2011]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.      9041        OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 13788 of 2011]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.        9042      OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20917 of 2011]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.           9043   OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20918 of 2011]

                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.   9044       OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11261 of 2010]

                   CIVIL APPEAL NO.    9045       OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12993 of 2010]

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.     9046         OF 2012
                  [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 18407 of 2011]



                               J U D G M E N T


Swatanter Kumar J.




1.    Leave granted in all the Special Leave Petitions.

2.    These appeals are directed against the judgment of the High  Court  of
Judicature at  Allahabad,  Lucknow  Bench.  Though  dated  differently,  the
questions of law involved in all these  appeals  are  identical  based  upon
somewhat similar facts.  SLP(C) No. 35569 of  2010  was  filed  against  the
order dated 24th September,  2008,  SLP(C)  No.  35568  of  2010  was  filed
against the order dated 29th September, 2008, SLP(C) No. 35565 of  2010  was
filed against the order dated 14th September,  2009,  SLP(C)  No.  35566  of
2010 against the order dated 18th  September,  2010,  SLP(C)  No.  35279  of
2009, SLP(C) No. 24562 of 2010, SLP(C) No. 24564  of  2010  and  SLP(C)  No.
35567 of 2010 against the order dated 14th October, 2009, SLP(C)  No.  12993
of 2010, SLP(C) No. 24563 of 2010 and SLP(C) No. 35561 of 2010  against  the
order dated 16th November, 2009, SLP(C) No. 11261 of 2010 against the  order
dated 21st January, 2010, SLP(C) No. 35562 of 2010 against the  order  dated
9th April, 2010, SLP(C) No. 9156  of  2011  against  the  order  dated  19th
January, 2011, SLP(C) No. 20918  of  2011  and  SLP(C)  No.  13788  of  2011
against the order dated 28th April, 2011, SLP(C) No. 20917 of  2011  against
the order dated 29th April, 2011 and SLP(C) No. 18407 of  2011  against  the
order dated 26th April, 2011.

3.    We have taken the case of Ashok Kumar Nigam (supra) i.e. Civil  Appeal
@ SLP(C) No. 35279 of 2009 as the lead case.   Before we proceed  to  notice
the facts giving rise to the present appeal in that case,  it  is  necessary
for us to notice that SLP  (Civil)  No.  9156  of  2011  has  been  directed
against an interim order passed by the Division Bench of that High Court  in
Miscellaneous Bench No. 523 of 2003 titled “Pramod Sharma v. State of  Uttar
Pradesh”.  The interim order dated 19.1.2011 had directed  that  no  regular
appointment shall be made on the post Government Advocate in  place  of  the
appellant.  Vide its judgment dated 10th February, 2011, the Division  Bench
of the High Court finally disposed of the  interim  application  by  staying
the operation of the orders dated 24th December,  2010  and  28th  December,
2010 passed by the respondents.  It further directed that the  appellant  be
allowed to continue as the District Government  Counsel  (Criminal)  subject
to any decision being taken afresh in accordance with the  directive  issued
by the judgment of that Court passed in Writ Petition No.10038(MB) of  2009.
 In other words, the interim order had merged into the  order  of  the  High
Court dated 10th February, 2011 against which as of  now,  no  petition  has
been filed.   Thus, the special leave petition No. 9156  of  2011  has  been
rendered infructuous and is accordingly dismissed as such.

SLP(C) No. 35279 of 2009

4.    Mr. Ashok Kumar Nigam, respondent herein  was  appointed  as  District
Government Counsel on 17th September, 2004 vide  a  notification  issued  by
the State Government.   The term of the said respondent was renewed  on  3rd
March, 2006 for a period of one year and as such his term came to an end  on
5th March, 2007.   The respondent submitted his application for  renewal  of
his term on 19th  January,  2007.   The  District  Judge,  Lucknow  on  26th
February, 2007 gave his report and the District  Magistrate  also  submitted
his report on 5th March, 2007 recommending the renewal of the  term  of  the
respondent.     However, the State Government, appellant herein, vide  order
dated 3rd April, 2008 refused his renewal which resulted in cancellation  of
engagement of the said respondent.  The order  dated  3rd  April,  2008  can
usefully be reproduced at this stage:-

          “From
          Acharya Suresh Babu
          Deputy Secretary
          Government of Uttar Pradesh


          To

          The District Magistrate
          Lucknow


          Nyay-Anubhag-3-Appointment Lkw, dated 3.4.2008

          Sub: Renewal  of  Tenure  of  engagement  of  District  Government
          Counsels at the District Level


          Sir,

          With reference to your  Letter  No.  855/JA(2)/Advocate-Renewal/07
          dated 5.3.2007, I  have  been  directed  to  say  that  after  due
          consideration, the Hon’ble Governor  had  kindly  ordered  not  to
          renew the tenure of  engagement  of  Sh.  Ashok  Kumar  Nigam,  as
          District Government Counsel (Criminal), Lucknow.

          Accordingly, in the aforesaid background, the engagement order  of
          Sh. Ashok Kumar Nigam, as District Government  Counsel  is  hereby
          terminated.

          Please take necessary action at your end and forward your proposal
          from  the  panel  of  Advocates  for  being  engaged  as  District
          Government Counsel against the consequential vacancy.”



5.    Aggrieved from the above order, the  respondent  filed  writ  petition
before the High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench.   In the  writ  petition,
the stand taken by the respondent  was  that  in  terms  of  the  rule,  the
petitioner has a right to continue and in  any  case  for  consideration  of
renewal of his term, the impugned order does not state any reasons  and,  in
fact, does not take into  consideration  the  recommendations  made  by  the
District  and  Sessions  Judge  and  the  District   Magistrate,   who   had
recommended renewal of the term of the respondent.    The High  Court  after
hearing the counsel appearing for the parties, vide its judgment dated  14th
October, 2009, allowed the writ petition, setting aside the order dated  3rd
April, 2008  and  even  granting  further  relief  to  the  appellant.   The
operative part of the High Court judgment reads as under:-

            “For  the  reasons  stated  above,  the  order  impugned  dated
            03.04.2008 is hereby set aside.

            We are informed that  no  person  has  yet  been  appointed  or
            engaged in place of the petitioner,  in  view  of  the  interim
            order passed by this Court, we, therefore, further provide that
            the petitioner shall be allowed to continue  to  discharge  the
            functions and duties of the District Government  Counsel,  till
            the consideration of the renewal of his term in accordance with
            law.

            We may further clarify that the  renewal  of  the  petitioner’s
            term shall  be  considered  in  accordance  with  the  relevant
            provisions  of  L.R.  manual  (unamended  para  7.08   as   the
            amendments made in L.R. Manual are subject matter of  challenge
            in W.P. No. 7851 (M/B) of 2008 wherein  the  implementation  of
            the amended provisions stand stayed) if he has not crossed  the
            age of 60 years but if he has already attained the  age  of  60
            years, but has not yet reached the age of  62  years  then  his
            case will be considered for extension of his term upto the  age
            of  62  years  and  for  that  consideration,  if  any  further
            formalities are  to  be  completed  or  some  certificates  are
            needed, he shall be given an opportunity to furnish  the  same,
            so that his case may  be  considered  in  accordance  with  the
            relevant rules.   Writ petition is allowed.   Cost easy.”



6.    Aggrieved from the above judgment of the  High  Court,  the  State  of
Uttar Pradesh (appellant herein) has filed the present  appeal  before  this
Court.   The challenge to the impugned order is, inter alia,  but  primarily
on the following grounds:-

   A)  In terms of the relevant rule, the State Government has discretion to
      terminate the term of the District Government Counsel (Criminal),  and
      in any case, the term of the respondent had come to an end  by  efflux
      of time, and therefore, the High Court has exceeded  its  jurisdiction
      in setting aside the order dated 3rd April, 2008.

   B) At best, if allowing the writ petition, the High Court could set aside
      the impugned order, but could not direct  that  they  be  retained  or
      continued till the age of 60 or 62 years as the  case  may  be.    The
      respondent would only have a right of consideration and nothing  more,
      therefore, the judgment  of  the  High  Court  suffers  from  apparent
      errors.  The High Court gave no reasons much less  valid  reasons  for
      setting aside the order dated 3rd April, 2008.



7.    Opposed to the above contentions, it is contended  on  behalf  of  the
respondents that the order dated 3rd April, 2008 was  a  non-speaking  order
and suffered from the vice of non-application of mind and was arbitrary  and
has correctly been set aside by the High Court.   Reliance  in  this  regard
is placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case  of  Kumari  Shrilekha
Vidyarthi and Others v. State of U.P. & Ors. [(1991) 1 SCC  212].   Further,
that the impugned order dated 3rd April, 2008 is contrary to  the  rules  in
force.  The order of the High Court under  appeal  does  not  call  for  any
interference.

8.    Before we examine the merit or otherwise of the contentions,  it  will
be appropriate for this court to notice the relevant rule.    Chapter  7  of
the Legal Remembrancer’s Manual  deals  with  District  Government  Counsel.
In  terms  of  Para  7.01,  the  District  Government  Counsel   are   legal
practitioners appointed by the State Government to  conduct  in  any  court,
other than the High Court, such civil, criminal or revenue cases  on  behalf
of the State Government as assigned to them either generally  or  specially.
Para 7.02 deals with the power  of  the  government  to  appoint  government
counsels in the districts.   As per this provision, the  government  was  to
ordinarily  appoint  District  Government   Counsel   (Criminal),   District
Government Counsel (Civil) and District  Government  Counsel  (Revenue)  for
each district, for which they have to make an application.

9.    Under these rules, the appointments are to be made and renewal  to  be
considered upon the recommendation of the District Officer and the  District
Judge.   The rules even state the factors which are to weigh in the mind  of
the recommending authority while  recommending  or  declining  to  recommend
renewal of term of the government pleaders.    Paras  7.6  to  7.8  read  as
under:-

          “7.06. Appointment  and  renewal  –  (1)  The  legal  practitioner
          finally selected by  the  Government  may  be  appointed  District
          Government Counsel for one year from the date of his  taking  over
          charge.

          (2) At the end of the aforesaid period, the District Officer after
          consulting the District Judge shall submit a report  on  his  work
          and conduct to the legal Rememberancer together with the statement
          of work done in Form no. 9.   Should his work or conduct be  found
          to  be  unsatisfactory  the  matter  shall  be  reported  to   the
          Government for orders.   If the report in respect of his work  and
          conduct is satisfactory, he  may  be  furnished  with  a  deed  of
          engagement in Form no. 1 for a term no exceeding three years.   On
          his first engagement a copy of Form no. 2 shall be supplied to him
          and he shall complete and return it to the Legal Remembrancer  for
          record.

          (3) The appointment  of  any  legal  practitioner  as  a  District
          Government Counsel is only professional engagement  terminable  at
          will on either side and is not appointment to  a  post  under  the
          Government.   Accordingly the Government  reserves  the  power  to
          terminate the appointment of any District  Government  Counsel  at
          any time without assisting any cause.

          7.08. Renewal of term – (1)  At  least  three  months  before  the
          expiry of the term of a District Government Counsel, the  District
          Officer shall after consulting the District Judge and  considering
          his past record of work, conduct and  age,  report  to  the  Legal
          Remembrancre, together with the statement of work done by  him  in
          Form no. 9 whether in his opinion the term of appointment of  such
          counsel should be renewed or not.   A copy of the opinion  of  the
          District Judge should also be sent along with the  recommendations
          of the District Officer.

          (2) Where recommendation for  the  extension  of  the  term  of  a
          District Government Counsel is made for a specified  period  only,
          the reasons thereof shall also be stated by the District Officer.

          (3) While forwarding his recommendation for renewal of the term of
          a District Government Counsel –

              (i) The District Judge shall give an estimate of the  quality
              of the Counsel’s work from the judicial stand point,  keeping
              in view the different aspects of a lawyer’s capacity as it is
              manifested  before  him  in  conducting  State   cases,   and
              specially his professional conduct;

              (ii) The District Officer shall give  his  report  about  the
              suitability of  the  District  Government  Counsel  from  the
              administrative  point  of  view,  his  public  reputation  in
              general, his character, integrity and professional conduct.

          (4) If the Government  agrees  with  the  recommendations  of  the
          District Officer for the renewal of the  term  of  the  Government
          Counsel, it may pass orders for re-appointing him for a period not
          exceeding three years.

          (5) If the Government  decides  not  to  re-appoint  a  Government
          Counsel, the Legal Remembrancer may call upon the District officer
          to forward fresh recommendations in the manner laid down  in  para
          7.03.

          (6) The procedure prescribed in this para shall be followed on the
          expiry of every successive period  of  renewed  appointment  of  a
          District Government Counsel.”



10.   From the above rules, it is clear that the government counsel  has  to
be appointed and/or his term renewed upon  recommendation  of  the  District
Judge and  the  District  Officer  and  in  accordance  with  the  procedure
prescribed under the above rules.   It  is  only  when  the  recommendations
based upon stated criteria are unfavourable to  the  applicant  in  question
that the government could decline renewal of  the  term.    In  the  present
case, we are not concerned with the appointment as such.   All the cases  in
hand are cases of renewal of term.

11.   The High Court in its judgment has noticed that the  order  dated  3rd
April, 2008 clearly shows that the request for  renewal  has  been  rejected
without considering the recommendation of the District  Judge  and  District
Magistrate.   The High Court has even noticed in its judgment that  in  view
of this fact it had called for the records and the records produced did  not
show proper consideration by the State Government before refusing  to  grant
renewal of the term of the respondent.  The High  Court  also  noticed  that
the Government had taken enblock decision that the renewal in the  cases  of
such Government counsel whose term have come to an end will not be  granted.
 It was in pursuance to this decision that the government refused  to  grant
renewal to the respondent as well.

12.   The High Court had examined the  records  and  after  being  satisfied
that the record produced did not exhibit proper application of mind  or  due
consideration as per prescribed procedure and the  action  being  arbitrary,
had set aside the order dated 3rd April, 2008.   There is nothing on  record
placed before this court by the appellant that could demonstrate  that  such
view of  the  High  Court  suffered  from  any  infirmity.   The  prescribed
procedures under para 7.08 of the Manual requires the government  to  invite
to invite opinion of the District Judge and District Officer,  three  months
prior to the expiry of the term of  the  District  Government  Counsel.   By
amendment,  proviso  was  added  to  para  7.03  to  provide  that  District
Magistrate shall always be free to nominate such person  who  may  be  found
eligible but who had not submitted particulars for being appointed as  such.
 As per the prescribed  procedure,  the  office  of  Legal  Remembrance  was
expected to consider the past record of work and conduct  of  the  concerned
District Government Counsel and then to send  a  report  together  with  the
statement of work done by  such  applicant.   The  High  Court  had  clearly
stated  the  principle  that   where   there   is   conflict   between   the
recommendation of the District Judge and the  District  Magistrate,  primacy
shall be given to the report of the District Judge.  Thus, in  our  opinion,
the onus is shifted to the State to show that it  had  acted  in  accordance
with the prescribed procedure and its action does not suffer from  the  vice
of discrimination and arbitrariness.
13.   Total non-application of mind and the  order  being  supported  by  no
reason  whatsoever  would  render   the   order   passed   as   ‘arbitrary’.
Arbitrariness shall vitiate the administrative order.   The rules provide  a
procedure and even require the State Government to  consider  the  case  for
renewal of the government counsel whose term is  coming  to  an  end.    The
scheme of para 7.06 of the  Manual  is  that  appointment  of  a  government
pleader is to be made for a period of  one  year  and  at  the  end  of  the
period, the District Officer in consultation  with  the  District  Judge  is
required  to  submit  a  report  on  the  work  and  conduct  to  the  legal
remembrancer together with the work done in Form 9.   It is  only  when  his
work or conduct is found to be unsatisfactory that it is so reported to  the
government for appropriate orders.  If the report is satisfactory, the  rule
requires that he may be furnished with a deed of engagement in form  I,  for
a term not exceeding three years, on his  first  engagement.   In  terms  of
para  7.06  (3),  the  Government  reserves  the  power  to  terminate   the
appointment  of  any  District  Government  Counsel  at  any  time   without
assigning any cause.   Firstly, one has to  examine  the  entire  scheme  of
para 7.06 (3).  It cannot be read in isolation.  The right of  consideration
for renewal for the specified period is a  legitimate  right  vested  in  an
applicant and he can be deprived of  such  right  and  be  declined  renewal
where his work is  unsatisfactory  and  is  so  reported  by  the  specified
authorities.   It is difficult to comprehend that clause (3)  of  para  7.06
can be enforced in the  manner  as  suggested.    If  it  is  construed,  as
suggested, that the government  has  an  absolute  right  to  terminate  the
appointment at any time without specifying any reason, it will be  violative
of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and such  rule  shall  be
arbitrary, thus not sustainable in law.   In the  case  of  Delhi  Transport
Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor  Congress  [1991  Supp.  (1)  SCC  600]  while
dealing with Regulation 9, which was worded similarly, this  Court  held  as
under:-

            “202. Thus on a conspectus of the catena of  cases  decided  by
           this Court the only conclusion that follows is  that  Regulation
           9(b) which confers powers on  the  authority  to  terminate  the
           services of a permanent and  confirmed  employee  by  issuing  a
           notice terminating the services or by making payment in lieu  of
           notice without assigning any reasons in the  order  and  without
           giving any opportunity of hearing to the employee before passing
           the  impugned  order  is  wholly  arbitrary,   uncanalised   and
           unrestricted violating principles of natural justice as well  as
           Article  14  of  the  Constitution.  It  has  also   been   held
           consistently by  this  Court  that  the  government  carries  on
           various trades and business activity through the instrumentality
           of the State such as Government Company or Public  Corporations.
           Such  Government  Company  or  Public  Corporation  being  State
           instrumentalities are State within the meaning of Article 12  of
           the Constitution and as such they are subject to the  observance
           of fundamental rights embodied in Part III as well as to conform
           to the directive principles in Part IV of the  Constitution.  In
           other words the Service Regulations or Rules framed by them  are
           to be tested by the touchstone of Article  14  of  Constitution.
           Furthermore,  the  procedure  prescribed  by  their   Rules   or
           Regulations must be reasonable, fair and just and not arbitrary,
           fanciful  and  unjust.  Regulation  9(b),   therefore,   confers
           unbridled, uncanalised and arbitrary power on the  authority  to
           terminate the services of a permanent employee without recording
           any reasons and without conforming to the principles of  natural
           justice. There is no guideline in the Regulations or in the Act,
           as to when or in which cases and  circumstances  this  power  of
           termination by giving notice or pay in lieu  of  notice  can  be
           exercised. It is now well settled that the ‘audi alteram partem’
           rule which in essence, enforces the equality clause  in  Article
           14 of the Constitution is applicable not only to  quasi-judicial
           orders but to administrative orders affecting prejudicially  the
           party-in-question unless the application of the  rule  has  been
           expressly excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not
           the case here. Rules of natural  justice  do  not  supplant  but
           supplement the Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of  Law
           which permeates our Constitution  demands  that  it  has  to  be
           observed both substantially and procedurally.  Considering  from
           all aspects Regulation  9(b)  is  illegal  and  void  as  it  is
           arbitrary,  discriminatory  and  without  any   guidelines   for
           exercise of the power. Rule of law posits that the power  is  to
           be exercised in a manner which is just, fair and reasonable  and
           not in an unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary  manner  leaving
           room for discrimination.  Regulation  9(b)  does  not  expressly
           exclude the application of the ‘audi alteram partem’ rule and as
           such the order of termination of service of a permanent employee
           cannot be passed  by  simply  issuing  a  month's  notice  under
           Regulation 9(b) or pay in lieu  thereof  without  recording  any
           reason in the order  and  without  giving  any  hearing  to  the
           employee to controvert the allegation on the basis of which  the
           purported order is made.


           203. It will be profitable  to  refer  in  this  connection  the
           observations of this Court in the case  of  Union  of  India  v.
           Tulsiram Patel where  the  constitutionality  of  provisions  of
           Article 311 particularly the second Proviso to clause (2) of the
           said article came up for consideration. This Court  referred  to
           the findings in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India  wherein  it
           was held that though the  origin  of  a  government  service  is
           contractual yet when once appointed to his post or  office,  the
           government  servant  acquires  a  status  and  his  rights   and
           obligations are no longer determined by the consent of both  the
           parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may  be  framed
           and altered unilaterally by the government. In other words,  the
           legal position of a government servant is  more  one  of  status
           than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a
           legal relationship of rights and duties imposed  by  the  public
           law and not by mere  agreement  of  the  parties.  It  has  been
           observed that Article 14 does not govern or control Article 311.
           The Constitution  must  be  read  as  a  whole.  Article  311(2)
           embodies  the  principles  of  natural  justice  including  audi
           alteram partem rule. Once  the  application  of  clause  (2)  is
           expressly excluded by the Constitution itself, there can  be  no
           question of making applicable  what  has  been  so  excluded  of
           seeking recourse to Article 14 of the Constitution.”




14.   Thus, in our opinion it was not  permissible  for  the  government  to
take recourse to Para 7.06 (3) in the manner in which it  has  done  and  in
any case, the said rule can hardly be sustained in law.

15.   The order dated 3rd April, 2008  is  even  liable  to  be  quashed  on
another ground, that it is a non-speaking  order  also  suffering  from  the
vice of non-application of mind.  As already discussed, the  government  has
taken an enblock decision, without recording any reason, not  to  renew  the
term of any of the government counsel. That itself shows that  there  is  no
application of mind.   In the case of Kumari Shrilekha (supra),  this  Court
expressed the opinion that it would be alien to  the  Constitutional  Scheme
to accept the argument of exclusion of  Article 14 in  contractual  matters.
 The arbitrary act of the  State  cannot  be  excluded  from  the  ambit  of
judicial review merely on the ground that it is a contractual  matter.   The
expression ‘At any time without assigning any cause’, can  be  divided  into
two portions, one “at any time”, which merely means the termination  may  be
made even during the subsistence of the  term  of  appointment  and  second,
“without assigning any cause” which means without  communicating  any  cause
to  the  appointee  whose  appointment  is  terminated.  However,   “without
assigning any cause” is not to be equated with  “without  existence  of  any
cause”.

16.   Further, this Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner,  Commercial
Tax Department, Works Contract and Leasing v. Shukla and Brothers [(2010)  4
SCC 785], impressed upon the need for recording of  appropriate  reasons  in
orders and held as under:-

           “11. The Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India while
           referring to the practice adopted and insistence placed  by  the
           courts in United States, emphasised the importance of  recording
           of reasons for decisions by the administrative  authorities  and
           tribunals.  It  said  “administrative  process  will   best   be
           vindicated by clarity in its exercise”. To enable the courts  to
           exercise  the  power  of  review  in  consonance  with   settled
           principles, the authorities are advised  of  the  considerations
           underlining the action under review. This  Court  with  approval
           stated: (SCC p. 602, para 11)

                    ‘11. … ‘the orderly functioning of the process of review
                 requires that the grounds  upon  which  the  administrative
                 agency  acted   be   clearly   disclosed   and   adequately
                 sustained’.’


           12. In exercise of the power of judicial review, the concept  of
           reasoned orders/actions has been enforced equally by the foreign
           courts as by the courts in India. The  administrative  authority
           and tribunals are obliged to give reasons, absence whereof could
           render the order liable to judicial chastisement. Thus, it  will
           not be far from an absolute principle of  law  that  the  courts
           should record  reasons  for  their  conclusions  to  enable  the
           appellate  or  higher  courts  to  exercise  their  jurisdiction
           appropriately and in accordance with law. It  is  the  reasoning
           alone, that can  enable  a  higher  or  an  appellate  court  to
           appreciate the controversy in issue in its  correct  perspective
           and to hold whether the reasoning recorded by  the  court  whose
           order is impugned, is sustainable in  law  and  whether  it  has
           adopted the correct legal approach. To subserve the  purpose  of
           justice delivery system, therefore, it  is  essential  that  the
           courts should record  reasons  for  their  conclusions,  whether
           disposing of the  case  at  admission  stage  or  after  regular
           hearing.”



17.   The order dated 3rd April,  2008,  which  we  have  reproduced  above,
clearly shows non-application of mind and non-recording  of  reasons,  which
leads only to one conclusion, that the said order was an arbitrary  exercise
of power by the State.   We cannot find any fault with the reasoning of  the
High Court in that behalf.   But we do find some  merit  in  the  contention
raised on behalf of the appellant State that the High Court should not  have
directed appointments while regulating the age, as  has  been  done  by  the
High  Court  in  operative  part  of  its  judgment.    There  is  right  of
consideration, but none can claim right to appointment.   Para  7.06  states
that renewal beyond 60 years shall depend upon continuous good  work,  sound
integrity  and  physical  fitness  of   the   counsel.     These   are   the
considerations which have been weighed by the  competent  authority  in  the
State Government  to  examine  whether  renewal/extension  beyond  60  years
should be granted or not.   That does not ipso facto means that there  is  a
right to appointment upto the age of 60 years irrespective of work,  conduct
and integrity of the counsel.   The  rule  provides  due  safeguards  as  it
calls for the  report  of  the  District  Judge  and  the  District  Officer
granting renewal.

18.   Thus, for the above-recorded reasons, while declining to interfere  in
the judgment of  the  High  Court,  we  direct  that  the  government  shall
consider cases  of  the  respondents  in  these  petitions  for  renewal  in
accordance with the procedure prescribed and criteria laid down under  Paras
7.06 to 7.08 of the LR Manual.   The consideration  shall  be  completed  as
expeditiously as possible and, in any case,  not  later  than  three  months
from today.

19.   Subject to the above  observations,  all  the  appeals  are  dismissed
without any order as to costs.




                                       .………...….…………......................J.
                                           (Swatanter Kumar)








                                 …..…………..................................J.
                                         (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)
New Delhi,
December 13, 2012