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Thursday, December 13, 2012

the respondent sought a recall of the order dated 13.02.2008 on the ground that he could subsequently come to know that his marriage with the appellant was void on the ground that at the time of the said marriage the appellant was already married to one Rohit Kumar Mishra. In support, the respondent – husband had placed before the learned trial court the certificate of marriage dated 18.04.2003 between the appellant and the said Rohit Kumar Mishra issued by the competent authority under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1954’)- It is only upon a declaration of nullity or annulment of the marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration of the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be justified. In the absence of any valid decree of nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed on the footing that the relationship between the parties is one of marriage and not in the nature of marriage. We would also like to emphasise that any determination of the validity of the marriage between the parties could have been made only by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding by and between the parties and in compliance with all other requirements of law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first marriage of the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not sufficient for any of the courts, including the High Court, to render a complete and effective decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in a collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we hold that in the present case until the invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits and protection available under the DV Act, 2005.


|REPORTABLE       |


           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                  CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION

            CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.2032-2033  of 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) Nos. 8076-8077 of 2010

Deoki Panjhiyara                                 ...Appellant

Versus

Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad &  Anr.                    …Respondents



                            J  U  D  G  M  E  N T



RANJAN GOGOI, J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    The appellant, who was married to the respondent in   the  year  2006,
had filed a petition under Section  12  of  the  Protection  of  Women  from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  DV  Act’)
seeking certain reliefs  including  damages  and  maintenance.   During  the
pendency of the aforesaid application the appellant   filed  an  application
for interim maintenance which was granted by  the  learned  trial  court  on
13.02.2008 at the rate of Rs.2000/- per month.  The  order  of  the  learned
trial court was affirmed by the learned Sessions  Judge  on  09.07.2008.  As
against the aforesaid order, the respondent (husband) filed a Writ  Petition
before the High Court of Jharkhand.

3.    While the Writ Petition was pending, the respondent  sought  a  recall
of the order dated 13.02.2008 on the ground that he could subsequently  come
to know that his marriage with the appellant was void on the ground that  at
the time of the said marriage the  appellant  was  already  married  to  one
Rohit Kumar Mishra.  In support, the respondent – husband had placed  before
the learned  trial  court  the  certificate  of  marriage  dated  18.04.2003
between the appellant  and  the  said  Rohit  Kumar  Mishra  issued  by  the
competent authority under Section 13  of  the  Special  Marriage  Act,  1954
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1954’).

4.   The learned trial court by order dated 7.8.2009 rejected the  aforesaid
application on the ground that notwithstanding the certificate issued  under
Section 13 of the  Act  of  1954,  proof  of  existence  of  the  conditions
enumerated in Section 15 of the Act would still required to be  adduced  and
only thereafter the certificate issued under Section 13 of the  Act  can  be
held to be valid.

5.      The  aforesaid  order  dated  07.08.2009  was  challenged   by   the
respondent-husband in a revision application before  the  High  Court  which
was heard alongwith the writ petition filed earlier.  Both  the  cases  were
disposed of by the impugned common order dated 09.04.2010 holding  that  the
marriage certificate dated 18.04.2003 issued under Section 13 of the Act  of
1954 was conclusive proof of the first marriage of the  appellant  with  one
Rohit Kumar Mishra which had the effect of rendering  the  marriage  between
the appellant and the respondent null and void.  Accordingly,  it  was  held
that as the appellant was not the legally wedded wife of the respondent  she
was not entitled to maintenance granted by the learned courts below.  It  is
against the aforesaid order of the High Court that the present appeals  have
been filed by the appellant – wife.

6.    We have heard Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel for  the  appellant
and Shri Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent.

7.    Learned counsel for the  appellant  has  strenuously  urged  that  the
allegation of the earlier marriage between the  appellant  and  Rohit  Kumar
Mishra had been denied by the appellant at all stages and the said  fact  is
not substantiated only by the Marriage Certificate dated  18.04.2003.   Even
assuming the marriage between the appellant and the respondent to  be  void,
the parties having lived together, a relationship in the nature of  marriage
had  existed  which  will  entitle  the  appellant  to  claim  and   receive
maintenance under  the  DV  Act,  2005.   Placing  the  legislative  history
leading to the aforesaid enactment, it is urged  that  in  the  Bill  placed
before the Parliament i.e. Protection from Domestic Violence Bill,  2002  an
“aggrieved person” and “relative” was, initially, defined in  the  following
terms :

      “Section 2………

      (a)  “aggrieved  person” means any woman who is or has  been  relative
      of the respondent and who alleges to have been  subjected  to  act  of
      domestic violence by the respondent;

      (b)…

      ( c )…

      (d)….

      (e)….

      (f)…

      (g)…

      (h)….

      (i)”relative” includes  any  person  related  by  blood,  marriage  or
      adoption and living with the respondent.”



      Thereafter, the different clauses of the Bill  were  considered  by  a
Parliamentary Standing Committee and recommendations were made  that  having
regard to the object sought to be  achieved  by  the  proposed  legislation,
namely, to protect women from domestic  violence  and  exploitation,  clause
(2)(i) defining “relative” may be suitably  amended  to  include  women  who
have been living in relationship akin to marriages as well as  in  marriages
considered invalid by law. Pursuant to the aforesaid recommendation made  by
the Standing Committee, in place of the expression “relative”  appearing  in
clause 2(i) of the Bill, the  expression  “domestic  relationship”  came  be
included in clause (f)  of  Section  2  of  the  Act.   Learned  counsel  by
referring  to  the  definition   of   “aggrieved   person”   and   “domestic
relationship”  as  appearing  in  the  DV  Act,  2005  has  urged  that  the
legislative intent to include women, living in marriages subsequently  found
to be illegal or even in relationships resembling  a  marriage,  within  the
protective umbrella of the DV Act is absolutely clear and the same  must  be
given its full effect.  It is submitted that  having  regard  to  the  above
even if the marriage of  the  appellant  and  the  respondent  was  void  on
account of the previous  marriage  of  the  appellant,  the  said  fact,  by
itself, will not disentitle the appellant  to  seek  maintenance  and  other
reliefs under the DV Act, 2005.

8.    Before proceeding further it will be appropriate to  notice,  at  this
stage, the definition of the expressions “aggrieved  person”  and  “domestic
relationship” appearing in Section 2(a) and (f) of the DV Act, 2005.

      “Section 2…..

      (a)   “aggrieved person” means any women who is, or  has  been,  in  a
      domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been
      subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;

      (b)   ……

      (c)   ……

     d)     ……

      (e)   ……

      (f)   “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons
      who live or have, at any point of time, lived  together  in  a  shared
      household, when  they  are  related  by  consanguinity,  marriage,  or
      through a relationship in the nature  of  marriage,  adoption  or  are
      family members living together as a joint family.”



9.    Learned counsel, in all fairness, has also drawn the attention of  the
court to a decision rendered by a  coordinate  Bench  in   D.  Velusamy  vs.
D.Patchaimmal[1]  wherein  this  court  had  occasion   to   consider    the
provisions of Section 2(f) of the DV Act to come to the  conclusion  that  a
“relationship in the nature of marriage” is akin to a  common  law  marriage
which requires,  in addition to proof of the fact  that  parties  had  lived
together in a shared household as defined in Section 2(s)  of  the  DV  Act,
the following conditions to be satisfied:

      a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as  being  akin  to
         spouses.

      b) They must be of legal age to marry.

      c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a  legal  marriage,
         including being unmarried.

      d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held  themselves  out  to
         the world as being akin to spouses for  a  significant  period  of
         time…….”

                                                                   [Para 33]




10.   Learned counsel has, however, pointed out  that  in  Velusamy  (supra)
the issue was with regard to the meaning of expression “wife”  as  appearing
in Section 125 Cr.P.C. and therefore reference to the provisions of  Section
2(f) of the DV Act, 2005 and the conclusions recorded were not required  for
a decision of the issues arising in the  case.  Additionally,  it  has  been
pointed out that while rendering its opinion  in  the  aforesaid  case  this
Court had no  occasion  to  take  into  account  the  deliberations  of  the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on the different clauses of  Protection  of
Women from Domestic Violence Bill, 2002. It is also urged that the  equation
of the expression “relationship in the nature of  marriage”  with  a  common
law marriage and the stipulation of the four requirements noticed  above  is
not  based  on  any  known  or  acceptable  authority  or  source  of   law.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the scope and expanse  of  the  expression
“relationship in the nature of marriage” is open  for  consideration  by  us
and, at any rate, a reference of the said question to a larger  bench  would
be justified.

11.   Opposing the contentions advanced on behalf of the  appellant  learned
counsel for the respondent – husband has submitted that  the  object  behind
insertion of the expression “relationship in  the  nature  of  marriage”  in
Section 2(f) of the  DV Act  is to protect women  who have been misled  into
marriages by the male spouse by concealment of the  factum  of  the  earlier
marriage of the husband.  The Act  is  a  beneficial  piece  of  legislation
which  confers  protection  of  different  kinds  to  women  who  have  been
exploited or misled into a marriage.  Learned counsel has pointed  out  that
in the present case the situation is, however, otherwise. From the  marriage
certificate dated 18.04.2003 it is clear  that  the  appellant  was  already
married to one Rohit Kumar Mishra which fact was known to  her  but  not  to
the respondent.  The second marriage which is void and also gives rise to  a
bigamous relationship was voluntarily entered into by the appellant  without
the knowledge of the husband. Therefore, the appellant is  not  entitled  to
any of the benefits under the DV Act. In fact, grant of maintenance  in  the
present case would amount to conferment of benefit  and  protection  to  the
wrong doer which would go against the avowed  object  of  the  Act.  Learned
counsel has also submitted that the conduct of the appellant makes it  clear
that she had approached the court by suppressing  material  facts  and  with
unclean hands which disentitles her to  any  relief  either  in  law  or  in
equity.  In this regard the decision of this  court  in  S.P.  Changalvaraya
Naidu vs. Jagannath and others[2] has been placed before us.

12.   Having considered the submissions advanced  by  the  learned  counsels
for the contesting parties, we are of the view that  the  questions  raised,
namely, whether the appellant and the respondent have/had lived together  in
a shared household  after  their  marriage  on  4.12.2006;  if  the  parties
have/had lived together whether the same gives rise to relationship  in  the
nature of marriage within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the DV  Act,  2005;
whether the decision of this Court in Velusamy (supra) is  an  authoritative
pronouncement on the expression “relationship in  the  nature  of  marriage”
and if so whether the same would require reference to a  larger  Bench,  may
all be premature and  the  same  need  not  be  answered  for  the  present.
Instead,  in  the  first  instance,  the  matter  may  be  viewed  from  the
perspective indicated below.

13.   The Respondent before us had claimed (before the trial court  as  well
as the  High  Court)  that  the  marriage  between  him  and  the  appellant
solemnised on 4.12.2006, by performance of rituals in accordance with  Hindu
Law, was void on account of the  previous  marriage  between  the  appellant
with one Rohit Kumar Mishra. In support thereof, the respondent relied on  a
marriage certificate dated 18.4.2003 issued under Section 13 of the  Special
Marriage Act, 1954. Acting solely on the basis  of  the  aforesaid  marriage
certificate the learned trial court as well as the High Court had  proceeded
to determine the validity of the marriage between the  parties  though  both
the courts were exercising jurisdiction in  a  proceeding  for  maintenance.
However, till date, the marriage between the parties is yet to  be  annulled
by a competent court. What would be the  effect  of  the  above  has  to  be
determined first inasmuch as if, under the law,  the  marriage  between  the
parties still subsists the  appellant  would  continue  to  be  the  legally
married wife of the respondent so as to be  entitled  to  claim  maintenance
and other benefits under the DV Act,  2005.  Infact,  in  such  a  situation
there  will  be  no  occasion  for  the  Court  to  consider   whether   the
relationship between the parties is in the nature of a marriage.

14.   Admittedly, both the appellant and the respondent are governed by  the
provisions of the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955.  Section  11  of  the  Hindu
Marriage  Act  makes  it  clear  that  a  marriage  solemnised   after   the
commencement of the Act “shall be null and  void  and  may,  on  a  petition
presented by either party thereto against the other party,  be  so  declared
by a decree of nullity if it  contravenes  any  one  of  the  conditions  so
specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5.”

15.   While considering the provisions of Section 11 of the  Hindu  Marriage
Act, 1955 this Court in Yamunabai v. Anantrao[3] has taken the view  that  a
marriage covered by Section 11 is void-ipso-jure, that  is,  void  from  the
very inception. Such a marriage  has to be ignored as not  existing  in  law
at all. It was further held by this Court that a formal declaration  of  the
nullity of such a marriage is not a mandatory  requirement  though  such  an
option is available to either of the parties to a marriage.

      It must, however,  be noticed that in Yamunabai (supra) there  was  no
dispute between the parties either as regards the existence or the  validity
of the first marriage on the basis of which the second marriage was held  to
be ipso jure void.



16.   A similar view has been expressed by this Court in  a  later  decision
in M.M. Malhotra v.  Union  of  India[4]   wherein  the  view  expressed  in
Yamunabai (supra) was also noticed and reiterated.

17.   However, the facts in which the decision in M.M. Malhotra (supra)  was
rendered would require to be noticed in some detail:

      The appellant M.M. Malhotra was, inter alia, charged in a departmental
proceeding for contracting a plural marriage. In reply to the  charge  sheet
issued it was pointed out that the allegation of plural marriage was not  at
all tenable inasmuch as in a suit filed by  the  appellant  (M.M.  Malhotra)
for a declaration that the respondent (wife) was not his wife on account  of
her previous marriage to one D.J. Basu the said fact i.e. previous  marriage
was admitted by the wife leading to a declaration of the invalidity  of  the
marriage between the parties. The opinion of this  court  in  M.M.  Malhotra
(supra) was, therefore, once again rendered in  the  situation  where  there
was no dispute with regard to the factum of the earlier marriage of  one  of
the spouses.

18.   In the present case, however,  the  appellant  in  her  pleadings  had
clearly, categorically and consistently denied that she was married  to  any
person known  as  Rohit  Kumar  Mishra.  The  legitimacy,  authenticity  and
genuineness of the  marriage  certificate  dated  18.4.2003  has  also  been
questioned by the appellant. Though Section 11 of the  aforesaid  Act  gives
an option to either of the parties to a void marriage to seek a  declaration
of invalidity/nullity of such marriage, the exercise of such  option  cannot
be understood to be in all  situations  voluntarily.  Situations  may  arise
when recourse to a court for  a  declaration  regarding  the  nullity  of  a
marriage claimed by one of the spouses to be a void marriage, will  have  to
be insisted upon in departure to the normal rule.  This,  in  our  view,  is
the correct ratio of the decision of this Court  in  Yamunabai  (supra)  and
M.M. Malhotra (supra).  In this  regard,  we  may  take  note  of  a  recent
decision rendered by this Court  in  A.  Subash  Babu  v.  State  of  Andhra
Pradesh & Anr.[5] while dealing with the question  whether  the  wife  of  a
second marriage contracted during the validity of the first marriage of  the
husband would be a “person aggrieved” under Section 198 (1)(c) of  the  Code
of Criminal  Procedure  to  maintain  a  complaint  alleging  commission  of
offences under  section  494  and  495  IPC  by  the  husband.  The  passage
extracted below effectively illuminates the issue:

      “Though the law specifically does not cast obligation on either  party
      to seek declaration of nullity of marriage and it may be open  to  the
      parties even without recourse to the Court to treat the marriage as  a
      nullity,  such  a  course  is  neither  prudent  nor  intended  and  a
      declaration in terms of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act will have
      to be  asked  for,  for  the  purpose  of  precaution  and/or  record.
      Therefore, until the declaration  contemplated  by  Section 11 of  the
      Hindu Marriage Act is made by a competent Court, the woman  with  whom
      second marriage is solemnized continues to  be  the  wife  within  the
      meaning of  Section 494 IPC  and  would  be  entitled  to  maintain  a
      complaint against her husband.”



19.    In the present case, if according to  the  respondent,  the  marriage
between him and the appellant was void on account of the  previous  marriage
between the appellant and Rohit Kumar Mishra the respondent  ought  to  have
obtained the necessary declaration from the competent court in view  of  the
highly contentious questions  raised  by  the  appellant  on  the  aforesaid
score.  It is only upon  a  declaration  of  nullity  or  annulment  of  the
marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration  of
the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the  nature
of marriage” would be justified. In the  absence  of  any  valid  decree  of
nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed  on  the
footing that the relationship between the parties is  one  of  marriage  and
not in the nature of marriage. We would also  like  to  emphasise  that  any
determination of the validity of the  marriage  between  the  parties  could
have been made only by a competent court in  an  appropriate  proceeding  by
and between the parties and in compliance with  all  other  requirements  of
law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under  Section  13  of
the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first  marriage  of
the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not  sufficient  for  any  of  the
courts, including the  High  Court,  to  render  a  complete  and  effective
decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in  a
collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we  hold  that  in  the
present case until the invalidation of the marriage  between  the  appellant
and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct  to
proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to  be  the  wife  of  the
respondent so as to  entitle  her  to  claim  all  benefits  and  protection
available under the DV Act, 2005.

20.   Our above conclusion would render consideration of any  of  the  other
issues raised wholly  unnecessary  and  academic.   Such  an  exercise  must
surely be avoided.

21.    We, accordingly, hold that the interference made by  the  High  Court
with the grant of maintenance in favour of the  appellant  was  not  at  all
justified. Accordingly, the order dated 09.04.2010 passed by the High  Court
is set aside and the present appeals, are allowed.



                                  …………… ……………………….J.
                                  [ P. SATHASIVAM ]



                                  ……………………………………J.
                                  [RANJAN  GOGOI]

New Delhi,
December  12, 2012


-----------------------
[1]         (2010) 10 SCC 469

[2]         AIR 1994 SC 853

[3]        AIR 1988 SC 645
[4]        2005 (8) SCC 351
[5]          2011 (7) SCC 616



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