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Friday, December 14, 2012

whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short “the CBI”), established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short “the Special Police Act”), to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government.” 26. After considering the various decisions on this point, as also Article 246 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench ultimately answered the reference in the manner following : “In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to the CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly.” The review petitions are disposed of with the following directions : i) The CBI shall drop the inquiry into the assets of the Respondent No.4, Smt. Dimple Yadav, wife of Shri Akhilesh Yadav; ii) The CBI may take such independent action, as it considers fit, on the basis of the inquiry conducted by it pursuant to the directions given by this Court in the judgment under review, without seeking any direction from the Union of India or on the basis of any direction that may be given by it.


                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.272 OF 2007

                                     IN

                     WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005



1 AKHILESH YADAV                        …   PETITIONER


           VS.



           2 VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.          …   RESPONDENTS



                                    WITH


                   REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.339 OF 2007

                                     IN

                     WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005



1 MULAYAM SINGH YADAV                   …   PETITIONER


           VS.



           3 VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.          …   RESPONDENTS



                                    WITH


                   REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.347 OF 2007

                                     IN

                     WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005


1


2 PRATEEK YADAV                         …   PETITIONER


           VS.



           4 VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.          …   RESPONDENTS



                                    WITH


                   REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.348 OF 2007

                                     IN

                     WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005



1 SMT. DIMPLE YADAV                          …   PETITIONER


           VS.



           5 VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS.          …   RESPONDENTS






                               J U D G M E N T



ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.


1.    Certain questions of fact  and  law  were  raised  on  behalf  of  the
parties  when  the  review  petitions  were  heard.
Review  petitions  are
ordinarily restricted to the confines of the principles enunciated in  Order
47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but in this case,  we  gave  counsel  for
the parties ample opportunity to satisfy us  that  the  judgment  and  order
under review suffered from any error apparent on the face of the record  and
that permitting the order to stand would occasion a failure  of  justice  or
that the judgment suffered from some material  irregularity  which  required
correction in review.
The scope of a review petition is  very  limited  and
the submissions advanced were made mainly on  questions  of  fact.
  As  has
been repeatedly indicated by this Court, review of a judgment on account  of
some mistake or error apparent on the face of  the  record  is  permissible,
but an error apparent on the face of the record has to  be  decided  on  the
facts of each case as an erroneous decision by itself  does  not  warrant  a
review of each decision.
In order to appreciate the  decision  rendered  on
the  several  review  petitions   which   were   taken   up   together   for
consideration, it is necessary to give a background in  which  the  judgment
and order under review came to be rendered.

2.    One Vishwanath Chaturvedi, claiming to be an  Advocate  by  profession
and unconnected with any political party or  parties,  filed  Writ  Petition
(Civil) No.633 of 2005, inter alia, for the following relief :-

      “(a)  issue an appropriate writ in the nature  of  mandamus  directing
      Respondent No.1 to take appropriate  action  to  prosecute  Respondent
      Nos.2 to 5 under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for acquiring
      amassed assets more than the known source of their income by  misusing
      their power and authority;”



3.    In the Writ Petition, the Writ Petitioner provided  instances  of  the
wealth allegedly acquired by the said Respondents beyond their known  source
of income.
After a contested hearing, this Court was of the  view  that  the
inquiry should not be shut out at the threshold because  political  elements
were involved.
The prayer in the Writ Petition was, therefore, moulded  and
the same was disposed of on 1st March,  2007,  with  a  direction  upon  the
Central Bureau of Investigation, hereinafter referred to as  the  “CBI”,  to
inquire into the allegations  relating  to  acquisition  of  wealth  by  the
Respondent Nos.2 to 5. 
The CBI was also directed to find out as  to  whether
there was any truth in the allegations  made  by  the  Petitioner  regarding
acquisition of assets by the  said  Respondents  disproportionate  to  their
known source of income and to submit a report to the Union  of  India  which
could take further steps in the matter.

4. Soon, thereafter, the Respondent Nos.2 to 5 filed  Review  Petitions  for
review of the aforesaid judgment dated 1st  March,  2007  in  Writ  Petition
(Civil) No.633 of 2005 and the same was directed to  be  posted  before  the
Court on 16th March, 2007.
Subsequently, the Review Petitions  were  placed
for hearing before the Court on 20th March,  2007  and  ultimately  on  10th
February, 2009, the Court  directed  notice  to  issue  thereupon.
 On  1st
April, 2009, when  the  Review  Petitions  were  taken  up  for  hearing,  a
submission was made on behalf of the Review  Petitioners  that  one  of  the
questions, which could have a vital bearing on the matters, related  to  the
question
as to  
whether  the  Court  could  issue  directions  to  the  CBI,
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 6  of  the  Delhi  Special  Police
Establishment Act, 1946, which was under consideration of  the  Constitution
Bench in Civil Appeal Nos.6249-6250 of 2001  filed  by  the  State  of  West
Bengal.
The hearing of the Review Petitions was, therefore,  adjourned  till
a decision was pronounced by the Constitution Bench in  the  above  Appeals.
The Constitution Bench ultimately held that the High Court  was  within  its
jurisdiction in directing the CBI to investigate into a  cognizable  offence
alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State  without  the
consent of that State and the same would neither impinge  upon  the  federal
structure of the Constitution nor violate  the  doctrine  of  separation  of
powers and would be valid in law.  However,  a  note  of  caution  was  also
given and it was further observed that the  extra-ordinary  power  conferred
by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of  India  has  to  be  exercised
sparingly,  cautiously  and  in  exceptional  situations  where  it  becomes
necessary to provide credibility and instill  confidence  in  investigations
or where the incident may have national and international  ramifications  or
where such an  order  may  be  necessary  for  doing  complete  justice  and
enforcing fundamental rights.

5.    Thereafter, the Review Petitions were again taken up  for  hearing  on
8th February, 2011.

6.    Five broad  propositions  were  canvassed  on  behalf  of  the  Review
Petitioner, Shri Akhilesh Yadav, namely,

        i)       Can this Court direct a CBI inquiry without the consent of
           the State concerned?


       ii)       Does a Court have jurisdiction to refer the matter to  the
           CBI for investigation without forming a opinion as to whether  a
           prima facie case of the commission of an offence had  been  made
           out?


      iii)       Can the Supreme Court order a  CBI  investigation  without
           expressly invoking its jurisdiction under  Article  142  of  the
           Constitution of India?


       iv)       Could the Supreme Court have entertained the Writ Petition
           filed by the Respondent No.1 in the Review  Petition  under  the
           garb of a public interest litigation? and


        v)             Does the judgment and order dated 1st  March,  2007,
           passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.633 of 2005 warrant a  review
           thereof?



7.    Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the  Review
Petitioners, Shri Akhilesh Yadav and Smt. Dimple Yadav  did  not  press  the
first proposition, since, as indicated hereinbefore, the said  question  had
been settled by the Constitution Bench.

8.    On the second proposition, Mr. Dwivedi  urged  that  in  the  decision
rendered by this Court in Common Cause, A Registered Society  Vs.  Union  of
India & Ors. [(1999) 6 SCC 667], a Bench of three Judges of this  Court  had
specifically held that the CBI should not be involved  in  an  investigation
unless a prima facie case is found  and  established  against  the  accused.
Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that this Court had inter  alia  observed  that  the
right to life engrained in Article 21 of the  Constitution  means  something
more than mere survival or animal existence.  A man had,  therefore,  to  be
left alone to enjoy life without fetters and should not  be  allowed  to  be
hounded either by the police or CBI only to find out as to  whether  he  had
committed any offence or was living as a law abiding  citizen.   This  Court
also observed that even under Article 142 of the  Constitution,  this  Court
could not issue such a direction ignoring the substantive provisions of  law
and the constitutional rights available to a person.

9.    On the third proposition  relating  to  cases  where  this  Court  had
directed the CBI to investigate,  Mr.  Dwivedi  submitted  that  there  were
cases involving gross atrocities and State apathy and there were also  cases
which stand on a  different  footing  and  are  concerned  with  corruption.
Learned counsel submitted that in the present case no prima  facie  case  of
corruption had been established against the review  petitioners  and/or  any
of the proforma respondents and, accordingly, the  direction  given  to  the
CBI to conduct investigations against them was ex facie illegal.   Referring
to various judgments in which directions had been given  by  this  Court  to
the CBI to conduct investigation, there were special reasons  for  doing  so
in each case and not without  a  prima  facie  case  having  been  made  out
against them in  such  cases.   Mr.  Dwivedi  urged  that  the  CBI  has  no
jurisdiction to inquire or investigate into  a  matter  where  there  is  no
material to show prima facie  that  an  offence  has  been  committed.   Mr.
Dwivedi submitted that in the case of A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak [(1988)  2
SCC 602], this Court had held that no jurisdiction can be  conferred  beyond
the scope of the Act by Courts of law even with consent. He also urged  that
in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of  India  [(1998)  4
SCC 409], this Court had observed that even the powers under Article 142  of
the Constitution vested in this Court could not be  exercised  in  a  manner
which was contrary to the Statute. It is only on account of special  reasons
where it was felt that an investigation by the local police would  prove  to
be ineffective, that directions had been given to the CBI  to  take  up  the
investigation.  Mr. Dwivedi  submitted  that  there  were  no  such  special
reasons in the instant case which warranted the directions  being  given  to
the CBI to conduct investigation into  the  allegations  of  corruption  and
police excesses as well as human rights violations.

10.   As far as Smt. Dimple Yadav is concerned, Mr. Dwivedi  submitted  that
except for the fact that she is the wife of Akhilesh Yadav, who had  been  a
Member of Parliament since 2000, there is no other ground to treat her as  a
public servant  for  the  purposes  of  inquiry  by  the  CBI.
Mr.  Dwivedi
submitted  that  Smt.  Dimple  Yadav  carried  on  her   own   business   in
agricultural produce and had her own income which had been  wrongly  clubbed
by the Writ Petitioner with the assets of Shri Akhilesh Yadav to  bring  her
within the ambit of the investigation by the CBI  under  the  provisions  of
the Prevention of Corruption Act.
 It was further  submitted  that  there  is
also no allegation that Smt. Dimple Yadav had, in any way, aided or  abetted
any public servant  to  commit  any  act  which  could  have  attracted  the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act  and  including  Smt.  Dimple
Yadav in the inquiry against those who could be said to be public  servants,
amounts to harassment of a private individual having a  separate  source  of
income in respect of which no offence under the aforesaid Act could be  made
out.
Mr. Dwivedi contended that the inquiry directed  to  be  conducted  by
the CBI in relation to the assets held by  Shri  Adkhilesh  Yadav  and  Smt.
Dimple Yadav was contrary to the procedure established by law and could  not
have been ordered even upon invocation of powers under Article  142  of  the
Constitution and was, therefore, liable to be set aside in review.

11.   As far as the fourth proposition  is  concerned,  as  to  whether  the
Supreme Court  could  have  entertained  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the
Respondent No.1 in the review  petition  in  the  garb  of  Public  Interest
Litigation, Mr. Dwivedi submitted that the writ petitioner had not made  any
specific  allegation  against  the  review  petitioners  which   merited   a
direction by the Court to the CBI  to  conduct  an  investigation  into  the
allegations relating to acquisition of wealth by the Respondent Nos.2  to  5
in the writ petition, beyond their known  sources  of  income.  Furthermore,
the Writ Petitioner had links with the Indian National  Congress,  although,
he had denied any connections with the Congress  Party.  Mr.  Dwivedi  urged
that the Respondent No.1 herein had no locus standi  to  maintain  the  writ
petition as a Public Interest Litigation, since it was more  of  a  personal
enmity rather than a public cause which had resulted in the  filing  of  the
writ petition. Mr. Dwivedi submitted  that  the  entire  exercise  had  been
undertaken to malign the Respondent Nos.2 to 5 and was without  any  factual
basis and the writ petition had been filed only  to  harass  the  Respondent
No.2 to 5 therein and to tarnish their  reputation  amongst  the  people  of
Uttar Pradesh and also other parts of the  country.  Mr.  Dwivedi  submitted
that the writ petition had been  filed  with  the  mala  fide  intention  of
discrediting the Review Petitioner and his family members  in  the  eyes  of
the local public and to adversely affect their  political  fortunes  in  the
State.

12.   In addition to Mr. Dwivedi’s submissions, Mr. Mukul  Rohatgi,  learned
Senior Advocate, who also appeared for Smt.  Dimple  Yadav,  submitted  that
merely because she  belongs  to  a  family  of  politicians,  she  had  been
included within the ambit of  the  scope  of  the  investigation  which  was
unwarranted, since it did not have any nexus with the objects sought  to  be
achieved by such an inquiry.

13.   Mr. Rohatgi also submitted that since despite his denial it was  amply
clear  that  the  Writ  Petitioner,  Mr.  Vishwanath   Chaturvedi,   was   a
representative of the Congress Party, the Writ Petition ought to  have  been
dismissed in limine.  Mr. Rohatgi submitted that the  explanation  given  in
the judgment under review for invoking the Court’s powers under Article  142
of the Constitution relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Anis  Vs.
Union of India [(1994) Supp. 1 SCC 145], needed a second  look  in  view  of
the decision in the  Supreme  Court  Bar  Association  case  (supra).    Mr.
Rohatgi submitted that in Mohd. Anis’s case (supra), it had been  held  that
in order to do complete justice, the Supreme  Court’s  power  under  Article
142 of the Constitution was not circumscribed by  any  statutory  provision,
and the Supreme Court could direct an  investigation  by  the  CBI  into  an
offence committed within a State without  a  notification  or  order  having
been issued in that behalf, in public interest, to do  complete  justice  in
the circumstances of a particular case. However, in exercise of  its  powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court should  not  direct
a fishing inquiry without reference to the facts and  circumstances  of  the
offence of disproportionate assets under the Prevention of  Corruption  Act,
1988.  Mr.  Rohatgi  urged  that  subsequently  in  the  Supreme  Court  Bar
Association case (supra), this Court held that the powers conferred on  this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in  the  Court  and
are complementary to those powers which are specifically  conferred  on  the
Court by various Statutes, though not  limited  by  those  Statutes.   These
powers exist independent of the Statutes with a view to do complete  justice
between the parties.  However, the  powers  conferred  on  the  Court  under
Article 142 of  the  Constitution,  being  curative  in  nature,  cannot  be
construed as powers which authorize the  Court  to  ignore  the  substantive
rights of a litigant while dealing with the cause pending before it. It  was
further observed that “Article 142, even with the width  of  its  amplitude,
cannot be used to build  a  new  edifice  where  none  existed  earlier,  by
ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby  to
achieve something indirectly which cannot be  achieved  directly.  The  very
nature of the power must lead the Court to  set  limits  for  itself  within
which to  exercise  those  powers  and  ordinarily  it  cannot  disregard  a
statutory provision governing a  subject,  except  perhaps  to  balance  the
equities between  the  conflicting  claims  of  the  litigating  parties  by
‘ironing out the creases’ in a cause or matter before it.” It was  submitted
that the decision in the Supreme Court Bar Association case  (supra)  cannot
be reconciled with the reasoning  of  the  decision  in  Mohd.  Anis’s  case
(supra).  Mr. Rohatgi submitted that all the decisions  rendered  subsequent
to the decision rendered in the Supreme Court Bar Association case  (supra),
following the earlier decision  in  Mohd.  Anis’s  case  (supra),  were  per
incuriam.  In support  of  his  submission,  Mr.  Rohtagi  referred  to  the
decision  of  this  Court  in  Textile  Labour  Association   Vs.   Official
Liquidator [(2004) 9 SCC 741] wherein while examining the plenary  power  of
this Court under Article  142  of  the  Constitution,  it  referred  to  the
decision in the Supreme Court Bar Association  case  (supra).   Mr.  Rohatgi
concluded on the note that  under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution,  the
Supreme Court could always correct any error made by it and to  that  effect
it could recall its own order, as was held in  M.S.  Ahlawat  Vs.  State  of
Haryana [(2000) 1 SCC 278].

14.   Mr. Ashok Desai,  learned  Senior  Advocate,  who  appeared  for  Shri
Mulayam Singh Yadav, the Review Petitioner in Review Petition (C) No.339  of
2007, based his submissions mainly on the powers of  the  Supreme  Court  to
direct the CBI  to  conduct  an  investigation  in  respect  of  an  offence
committed within a State, without the consent of  the  State  Government  as
envisaged in Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,  1946,
hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  1946  Act’.   Mr.  Desai  attempted  to
distinguish the decisions rendered by this Court  in  the  case  of  Advance
Insurance Company Vs. Gurudasmal [(1970) 3 SCR 881 = (1970) 1 SCC  633]  and
in the case of Kazi Lhendup Dorzi Vs. CBI [(1994) Supp.  2  SCC  116].   Mr.
Desai submitted that while in the first case, the Government of  Maharashtra
had given its consent to the investigation by the CBI, in  the  latter  case
the question involved was not of grant of  permission  to  investigate  into
the case, but withdrawal of such consent which had already been granted.

15.   Mr. Desai reiterated the contentions, both  of  Mr.  Dwivedi  and  Mr.
Rohatgi, that powers under Article 142 of  the  Constitution  could  not  be
invoked in contravention of the provisions of a Statute and a  fortiori  the
provisions of the Constitution. Mr. Desai also urged  that  in  the  Supreme
Court Bar Association case (supra)  not  only  had  the  decision  in  Mohd.
Anis’s  case  (supra)  been  referred  to,  but  this  Court  had  expressly
disapproved the observation made therein by Mr.  V.C.  Misra  that  the  law
laid down in Prem  Chand  Garg  Vs.  Excise  Commissioner,  U.P.,  Allahabad
[(1962) Supp. 1 SCR 885], in which it had been  observed  that  despite  the
width of the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by Article  142(1),  even
this Court could not under the  said  provision  make  an  order  which  was
plainly inconsistent with the express statutory  provisions  of  substantive
law, much less, inconsistent  with  any  constitutional  provision,  was  no
longer good law.

16.   Mr. Desai submitted that since the decision in the Supreme  Court  Bar
Association case (supra)  had  not  been  considered  by  this  Court  while
rendering the judgment under review and the relief had been moulded  without
any discussion on such issue, the judgment was liable to be reviewed.

17.   Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, Senior Advocate, who  appeared  for  the  Respondent
No.5, Shri Prateek Yadav, reiterated the submissions made  by  Mr.  Dwivedi,
Mr. Rohatgi and Mr. Desai in relation  to  the  decision  rendered  by  this
Court in the  Supreme  Court  Bar  Association  case  (supra).   Dr.  Dhawan
submitted that the CBI, as a statutory body for the  purpose  of  conducting
criminal investigation in extra-ordinary circumstances with the  consent  of
the  State  Government,  could  exercise  powers  within  the   limits   and
constraints of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, which  fact
had not been considered in the decisions rendered in State  of  West  Bengal
Vs. Sampat Lal [(1985) 1 SCC 317], Bihar State Construction Co.  Vs.  Thakur
Munendra Nath Sinha [(1988) Supp. SCC 542] and also  in  Mohd.  Anis’s  case
(supra).  Dr. Dhawan submitted that  within  the  constitutional  framework,
the CBI could not encroach upon the powers of the police of several  States.
  Referring  to  Entry  80  in  List  I  of  the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the
Constitution and Article  239AA,  Dr.  Dhawan  submitted  that  the  Central
Government was not entitled to extend the powers  and  jurisdiction  of  the
members of the police force belonging to any area outside the  State  so  as
to enable the police of one State to exercise  powers  and  jurisdiction  in
any area outside that State without the consent of the State  Government  of
that State in which such area is situated.  Dr.  Dhawan  submitted  that  it
was, therefore, clear that the direction given by this  Court  to  the  CBI,
which is a creation of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946,  to
investigate into  a  State  subject,  was  contrary  to  the  constitutional
safeguards engrafted in Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh  Schedule  to  the
Constitution.  Reference was also made  by  Dr.  Dhawan  to  the  principles
evolved by the Privy Council in King Emperor Vs.  Khwaja  Nazir  Ahmed  [AIR
1945 PC 18] and Bhajan Lal Vs. State of Haryana [(1992) Supp.  1  SCC  335],
wherein it was observed that judicial review is subject  to  the  principles
of judicial restraint and must not  become  unmanageable  in  other  aspects
relating to the power of the Union  or  State  Governments.   Reference  was
also made to Section 5 of the 1946 Act which listed the classes of  offences
which may be inquired into by the CBI.

18.   Dr. Dhawan also contended that while entertaining  a  public  interest
litigation, it was always necessary for  the  Court  to  be  extra  cautious
since at the very initial stage no opportunity is given  to  the  Respondent
to state his case before notice is issued and at times it  could  result  in
premature reference to the CBI on a  view  short  of  a  prima  facie  case,
particularly where the public interest litigation was politically  motivated
to adversely affect the political consequences of the persons involved.  Dr.
Dhawan  lastly  submitted  that  the  direction  given  to  the  CBI   after
completion of the inquiry to submit its report to the  Union  of  India  was
clearly contrary to law and could not be sustained under any  circumstances.


19.   In addition to the  above  petitions,  we  had  also  considered  I.A.
Nos.16 and 17 of 2009 which had been filed by one Shri Ashutosh  Srivastava,
who appeared in-person in support of his application  for  being  impleaded.
Having heard learned counsel for  the  Respondents  and  the  Applicant  in-
person, we had reserved orders on the same.



20.   In the facts and circumstances of the case, we  are  not  inclined  to
implead Shri Srivastava in these proceedings and his application  for  being
impleaded stands rejected.

21.   Appearing for the Writ Petitioner, Vishwanath Chaturvedi,  Mr.  K.T.S.
Tulsi, learned Senior Advocate,  submitted  that  every  order  in  which  a
mistake may be noticed does not automatically call for a   review  and  that
the power of review could be invoked only in circumstances as  contained  in
Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil  Procedure  (CPC).   Referring  to  the
decision dated 16th June, 2008 of this Court in State  of  West  Bengal  Vs.
Kamal Sengupta  and  Anr.  in  Civil  Appeal  No.1694  of  2006,  Mr.  Tulsi
submitted that the term “mistake or error apparent”  which  finds  place  in
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, by its very connotation signifies  an  error  which  is
evident per se from the  record  of  the  case  and  does  not  require  any
detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or  legal
position.  In fact, in Parsion Devi Vs. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC  715]  it
was observed that if an error is  not  self-evident  and  detection  thereof
requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be  treated  as  an
error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule  1
CPC.  In other words, an order or decision or judgment cannot  be  corrected
merely because it is erroneous in law or on  the  ground  that  a  different
view could have been taken on a point of fact or law,  as  the  Court  could
not sit in appeal over its own judgment.  Similar views were expressed by  a
Five-Judge Bench of the Federal Court in Sir Hari Shankar Pal and  Anr.  Vs.
Anath Nath Mitter & Ors. [(1949)  FCR  36],  wherein  it  was,  inter  alia,
observed that a decision being erroneous in law is certainly no  ground  for
ordering review.

22.   Various other decisions were also referred to which  will  only  serve
to duplicate the decisions of this Court on the said issue.

23.   As has been indicated in paragraph 5  of  this  judgment,  five  broad
propositions were  canvassed  on  behalf  of  the  review  petitioner,  Shri
Akhilesh Yadav, which were mainly confined to the jurisdiction of  the  High
Court and the Supreme Court to  direct  a  CBI  inquiry  in  respect  of  an
offence alleged to have been committed within a State, without  the  consent
of the State concerned.  Along with the above, the locus standi of the  writ
petitioner to maintain the writ petition was also raised on behalf  of  Shri
Yadav. While the submissions on behalf of all the  review  petitioners  were
centered around the said two propositions, a specific issue  was  raised  by
Mr. Mukul Rohatgi as to whether the investigation and/or inquiry could  also
be extended to the assets of  Smt.  Dimple  Yadav,  wife  of  Shri  Akhilesh
Yadav, since she had neither held any post under the Government nor was  she
involved in the activities of her husband  or  father-in-law,  Shri  Mulayam
Singh Yadav. The  acquisition  of  wealth  by  her  was  attributed  to  her
agricultural income and not to any source of income through her husband  and
her father-in-law.

24.   Same were the submissions made by  Dr.  Rajiv  Dhawan,  appearing  for
Shri Prateek Yadav, and,  in  addition,  it  was  submitted  that  the  said
Respondent did not get a reasonable opportunity of stating his  case  before
the judgment was delivered in Writ  Petition  (C)  No.633  of  2005  on  1st
March, 2007.

25.   As far as the first contention is concerned, the same has been set  at
rest by the Constitution Bench in State  of  West  Bengal  &  Ors.  Vs.  The
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West  Bengal  &  Ors.,  being
Civil Appeal Nos.6249-6250 of 2001.
In the  very  first  paragraph  of  its
judgment the Constitution Bench set out the issue, which had  been  referred
to it for its opinion in the following terms :
           “The issue which has  been  referred  for  the  opinion  of  the
      Constitution Bench is whether the  High  Court,  in  exercise  of  its
      jurisdiction under Article 226  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  can
      direct the Central Bureau of  Investigation  (for  short  “the  CBI”),
      established under the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment  Act,  1946
      (for short “the Special Police  Act”),  to  investigate  a  cognizable
      offence, which is alleged to have taken place within  the  territorial
      jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government.”




26.   After considering  the  various  decisions  on  this  point,  as  also
Article 246 of the Constitution, the Constitution Bench ultimately  answered
the reference in the manner following :
           “In the final analysis, our answer to the question  referred  is
      that a direction             by the High Court,  in  exercise  of  its
      jurisdiction under Article 226 of the  Constitution,  to  the  CBI  to
      investigate a    cognizable offence alleged  to  have  been  committed
      within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will
      neither impinge upon the federal structure  of  the  Constitution  nor
      violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law.
       Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens,  this  Court
      and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but  also
      an    obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part
      III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular,
      zealously and vigilantly.”

27.   A note of caution was also given by the Constitution Bench, which,  in
fact, finds place in all the decisions relating to this issue, namely,  that
the power which is  vested  in  the  superior  courts  should  be  exercised
sparingly,  cautiously  and  in  exceptional  situations  where  it  becomes
necessary to provide credibility and instill  confidence  in  investigations
or where the incident may have national and international  ramifications  or
where such an  order  may  be  necessary  for  doing  complete  justice  and
enforcing fundamental rights.  The said note of caution is an  echo  of  the
observations made by this Court in Supreme Court Bar Association  Vs.  Union
of India & Anr. [(1998) 4 SCC 409], that such an inquiry by  the  CBI  could
be justified in certain circumstances to  prevent  any  obstruction  to  the
stream of justice.

28.   That this Court had jurisdiction to direct the CBI to make an  inquiry
into the accumulation of wealth by Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav and  his  family
members in excess of their known source of income, based on the  allegations
made in the writ petition, cannot be questioned.  By its judgment dated  1st
March,  2007,  this  Court  merely  directed  an  investigation   into   the
allegations made in the writ petition and to submit a report  to  the  Union
Government.  The submissions made on behalf of  the  review  petitioners  in
this  regard,  must,  therefore,  be  rejected,  except  in  regard  to  the
direction given to the CBI to submit a report of its inquiry  to  the  Union
Government.

29.   In addition,  the  submissions  made  qua  Smt.  Dimple  Yadav  merits
consideration, since when  the  order  under  review  was  passed,  she  had
neither held any public office nor Government post  and  was  essentially  a
private person notwithstanding her proximity  to  Shri  Akhilesh  Yadav  and
Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav. On reconsideration of her  case,  we  are  of  the
view that the investigation launched against her on the  issue  of  amassing
wealth beyond her known source of income, is  liable  to  be  dropped.   The
review petition, so far as Smt. Dimple Yadav is concerned, is,  accordingly,
allowed and the investigation conducted  by  the  CBI  against  her  should,
therefore, be dropped.

30.   As far as the other review petitioners are concerned, we have to  keep
in mind the fact that the scope and ambit of a review proceeding is  limited
and the order dated 1st March, 2007, in respect of  which  review  has  been
sought, was neither irregular nor without jurisdiction and was passed  after
considering the submissions made on behalf of the  respective  parties.  The
review proceedings cannot be converted into an appeal.

31.   The judgment under review does not,  in  our  view,  suffer  from  any
error apparent on the face of the record, except for  the  directions  given
in the case  of  Smt.  Dimple  Yadav.   There  is  another  error  which  we
ourselves are inclined to correct.  While disposing  of  the  writ  petition
and directing the CBI to inquire into the alleged acquisition of  wealth  by
the Respondent Nos.2 to 5, the CBI was directed to submit a  report  to  the
Union of India and on receipt of such report, the Union of India  was  given
the liberty to  take  further  steps  depending  upon  the  outcome  of  the
preliminary inquiry into the assets of the  said  respondents.   Since,  the
CBI is an independent body and is under  no  obligation  to  report  to  the
Union of India in regard to investigations undertaken by it,  the  direction
to submit a report of the inquiry to the Union  of  India  and  the  liberty
given to the Union of India to take further steps  on  such  report  is  not
contemplated in the scheme of the Delhi Special  Police  Establishment  Act,
1946. It is for the CBI to decide what steps it wishes to take on the  basis
of the inquiry conducted.  We, therefore, modify the order dated 1st  March,
2007, and direct that the directions given to the CBI to submit a report  of
its inquiry to the Union of India and the liberty  given  to  the  Union  of
India to take further steps on such report, be deleted from the order.

32.   The review petitions are disposed of with the following directions :

     i)          The CBI shall drop the  inquiry  into  the  assets  of  the
        Respondent No.4, Smt. Dimple Yadav, wife of Shri Akhilesh Yadav;

    ii)          The CBI may take such independent action, as  it  considers
        fit, on the basis of the    inquiry conducted by it pursuant to  the
        directions given by this Court in the judgment under review, without
        seeking any direction from the Union of India or on the basis of any
        direction that may be given by it.


                                                     …………………………………………………CJI.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                         (H.L. DATTU)
New Delhi
Dated: December 13, 2012.